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INTRODUCTION 
 
he determination and demarcation of fixed territories and the sub-
sequent allegiance between those territories and the individuals or 
groups of individuals that inhabit them is arguably the prime factor that 
creates room for individuals and groups within international and human 
rights law.1 In this sense, “international society”2 consists of individuals 
and groups that ostensibly gain legitimacy and locus standi in interna-
tional law by virtue of being part of a sovereign state.3 For example, al-
though it has been argued that notions of democratic governance have 
become widespread (or even a norm of customary international law),4 
this democracy—in order to gain international legitimacy—is assumed to 
be expressed within the narrow confines of an identifiable territorial 
unit.5
                                                                                                         
 *  Professor of Law and Head of Law Department, Middlesex University, London, 
England. Ph.D., International Law, University of Hull, England (1999); M.A., Interna-
tional Law and Politics, University of Hull, England (1996); B. Comm., Bombay Univer-
sity, India (1995). 
 While this state-centered model has been eroded by international 
 1. See BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 
(2001) (examining the process through which this “legitimacy” is validated in interna-
tional law). See also JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE BASIS OF OBLIGATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND OTHER PAPERS 47 (Hersch Lauterpacht & C.H.M. Waldock eds., 1958) (ex-
plaining the nexus between the individual and the state, defined on the basis of a fixed 
“territorial compartment”). 
 2. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD 
POLITICS 74–94 (2d ed. 1995). 
 3. See Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the State and Ethnic Communities in Polit-
ical Theory, in WILL KYMLICKA, THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 31 (1st ed. 1995); 
Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 725 
(1974). See, e.g., Cindy L. Holder & Jeff J. Corntassel, Indigenous Peoples and Multicul-
tural Citizenship: Bridging Collective and Individual Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 126 
(2002). 
 4. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 46 (1992). 
 5. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial 
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177 (1991) (explaining the importance of the territori-
al state, especially the clash between self-determination and territorial integrity). 
T 
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criminal law developments that eliminate the state action requirement,6 
nationality remains central to personal identity within the international 
system.7
The acquisition of defined and fixed territoriality is prerequisite to the 
recognition of statehood.
 
8 The quest for recognition has widespread ma-
nifestations in contemporary society, from indigenous peoples who seek 
control over the destiny of their ancestral lands to struggles for self-
determination in places such as Kosovo, Iraq, the Basque Country, and 
many others.9 Since states are primarily entrusted with the privilege of 
norm creation in international law, the emphasis on territoriality affects 
many who would lay claim to such recognition.10
                                                                                                         
 6. The rapid growth of international criminal law since the signature of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court has established that an individual can be held 
accountable for his or her actions beyond the veil of the state. See FROM NUREMBERG TO 
THE HAGUE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Philippe Sands ed., 
2003). See generally LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
(2002); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(2d ed. 2001) (elaborating on the court and its activities); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); THE ROME STATUTE 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gae-
ta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919–1998, 
in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1 (1998). 
 However, the notion of 
territoriality itself remains contested in international law. The implication 
 7. See generally Simon Caney, Individuals, Nations and Obligations, in NATIONAL 
RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 119–38 (Simon Caney, David George & Peter 
Jones eds., 1996). Cf. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL 
THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995) (arguing against a strict linkage between territory 
and identity). 
 8. See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. 881 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 9. See MORTON H. HALPERIN & DAVID J. SCHEFFER WITH PATRICIA L. SMALL, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1992); ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-
DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1991). See also LUIS NÚÑEZ 
ASTRAIN, THE BASQUES: THEIR STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (Meic Stephens trans., 
1997) (discussing the Basque claim to self-determination); DENISA KOSTOVICOVA, 
KOSOVO: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND SPACE (2005) (discussing the claim to statehood 
in Kosovo); KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS IN IRAQ: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2004) 
(discussing the claim of the Kurds in the context of Iraq). 
 10. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2d ed. 2006) (1979); R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963); OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE 
STATEHOOD: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE FRAGMENTATION IN AFRICA (2000); NII 
LANTE WALLACE-BRUCE, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994); Ruth 
Lapidoth, Sovereignty in Transition, 45 J. INT’L AFF. 325 (1992). 
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of this contest is most visible in the treatment of the right to self-
determination.11
To ascertain the manner in which the legal treatment of territory affects 
groups seeking self-determination, this Article seeks to identify the inter-
national legal regime that governs the treatment of territory, trace its evo-
lution and purpose, and unpack the doctrinal tools that lie at the founda-
tion of territoriality in international law. By analyzing the interpretation 
of these norms by international judicial bodies, this Article will question 
the validity and measure the effectiveness of their application. 
 
This analysis will illustrate the dichotomy between the right to self-
determination and the issue of land rights. In order to retain its legitima-
cy, international law must reconceptualize the doctrines of territoriality 
and self-determination. This Article posits that this can be achieved by 
reconciling the traditional state-centered approach, which views self-
determination as an issue about the legitimacy of the state,12 with the 
human rights approach, which views self-determination13 as a founda-
tional right on which the edifice of human rights can be built.14
                                                                                                         
 11. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL 
REAPPRAISAL (1995); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION (1990); Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Prob-
lems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 857 (1994). 
 
 12. See, e.g., supra note 11 (illustrating that Antonio Cassese, Hurst Hannum, and 
Martti Koskenniemi are overtly concerned with the international process-oriented issues 
of state formation). 
 13. See generally PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
58–59 (“In any assessment of who or what is indigenous, the nature of self-organisation 
should be borne in mind, and group aspirations to a certain set of rights.”); S. James 
Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 3 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000); Benedict Kingsbury, 
Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in 
International & Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 190 n.4 (2001); 
Martin Scheinin, The Right to Self-Determination Under the Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 179 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). The more contempo-
rary works of S. James Anaya, Martin Scheinin, Benedict Kingsbury, and Patrick Thorn-
berry express greater concern over internal processes or democratic entitlement issues 
vis-à-vis state formation. 
 14. See generally OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-
DETERMINATION (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000) (examining the ways in 
which indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is expressed and received in vari-
ous fora); Michael Holley, Recognizing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to Their Tradi-
tional Lands: A Case Study of an Internally Displaced Community in Guatemala, 15 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 119 (1997) (examining the Mayan claim to their traditional lands); 
W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 
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This Article is divided into five main analytical parts. Part I explains 
the importance of the territorial state and the notion of territory in inter-
national law. Part II briefly outlines the laws governing the acquisition of 
territory in international society, identifies their historical antecedents, 
and provides a brief exposé of the methods legitimized by these doc-
trines. Against the more theoretical backdrop of Part II, Part III plots the 
development of the doctrinal tools that govern issues of territoriality in 
international law, tracing the reemergence of: (1) the doctrine of uti pos-
sidetis juris, with its attendant concept of the “critical date,” and (2) the 
principle of terra nullius, exemplified by the Creole emancipation from 
European rule. Part IV then reflects on the extent to which international 
tribunals have subsequently developed these doctrinal tools, with a focus 
on their treatment by the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). Lastly, 
Part V examines how the international laws governing territoriality can 
impact the right to self-determination. 
I. STATEHOOD, TERRITORIAL RIGHTS, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
The sovereign state is enshrined at the heart of the international legal 
system, where it functions as the primary actor in international law and 
politics.15
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
 In recognition of the rights of sovereign states, article 2(7) of 
the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter enunciates: 
                                                                                                         
AM. J. INT’L L. 350 (1995) (analyzing how the right to self-determination is being ex-
pressed in various domestic jurisdictions); Glen St. Louis, The Tangled Web of Sove-
reignty and Self-Governance: Canada’s Obligation to the Cree Nation in Consideration 
of Québec’s Threat to Secede, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 380 (1996) (raising the self-
determination question in the specific context of Québec). 
 15. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL “NATIONAL” IDENTITY 75–108 (2000). See also J.A. Andrews, The Concept of 
Statehood and the Acquisition of Territory in the Nineteenth Century, 94 L.Q. REV. 408 
(1978) (providing insight into how the state was perceived in the context of colonization); 
David Armstrong, Globalization and the Social State, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 461 (1998) 
(discussing the impact of globalization on the state); J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, 
The State & the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International 
Relations, 48 INT’L ORG. 107 (1994) (analyzing the pressures on the sovereign state as a 
concept and actor in international society). 
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not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 
VII.16
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States of 1934 sets out the key attributes of sovereignty: “[t]he State as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and 
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”
 
17 Though each 
of these concepts is problematic,18 “a defined territory” remains funda-
mental to the recognition of statehood and the trappings of sovereignty 
that accompany it.19
To identify such fixed territory, international law uses the doctrinal 
tools of uti possidetis juris and its older companion principle terra nul-
lius. Despite ancient origins in Roman law,
 
20 the periodic restatement of 
the doctrine of uti possidetis juris perpetuates its salience in the interna-
tional law governing territory.21
The doctrine of uti possidetis juris guarantees the rights of existing 
stakeholders to the land,
 
22
                                                                                                         
 16. U.N. Charter art. 2(7). See also 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 148–163 (Bruno Simma, Hermann Mosler & Andreas Paulus eds., 2002) 
(discussing the interpretation of article 2(7)). 
 and posits “that new States will come to inde-
 17. Montevideo Convention, supra note 8, art. 1. 
 18. See CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL “NATIONAL” IDENTITY, supra note 15, at 77–89. See also Charles G. Fenwick, 
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 201 
(1937) (providing a more detailed exposé of the issues germane to the Montevideo Con-
vention). 
 19. See TITLE TO TERRITORY (Malcolm Shaw ed., 1986). See generally SIBA 
N’ZATIOULA GROVOGUI, SOVEREIGNS, QUASI SOVEREIGNS AND AFRICANS: RACE AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185–96, 205–06 (1996) (addressing sove-
reignty in the context of decolonization in Africa).  
 20. See generally H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 259–63 (3d ed. 1972) (discussing the possessory interdicts). 
 21. See Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second 
Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 178 (1998) (discussing 
more recent enunciations of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris in the context of the Ba-
dinter Commission). See also Peter Radan, Post-Succession International Orders: A Crit-
ical Analysis of the Workings of the Badinter Commission, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 50 
(2000) (providing a detailed analysis of the Commission, its working, and its impact on 
the disintegration of the state of Yugoslavia). 
 22. See Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis 
Juris Today, 67 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97, 97–101 (1996). See generally Kaiyan H. Kaiko-
bad, Some Observations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries, 49 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 119, 126–27 (1983); Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti 
Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590 (1996). 
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pendence with the same boundaries that they had when they were admin-
istrative units within the territory or territories of one colonial power.”23 
The centrality of “order” to the propagation of international law cannot 
be underestimated, least of all at a time of transition when the fear of 
chaos and insurgence is uppermost in the new rulers’ minds.24 While 
Hugo Grotius did not refer to the doctrine of uti possidetis juris in De 
Pacis Juris Bella, his tacit support can be gleaned from his emphasis on 
the concept of order, which he considered to be a prime requirement 
within international law.25
The doctrine itself traces its roots directly to the jus civile in the Roman 
law norm of uti possidetis ita possidetis, which forms the basis of the 
modern doctrine.
 
26 Translated, uti possidetis ita possidetis reads, “as you 
possess, so you possess.”27 This possessory interdict was available to a 
praetor to prevent the “disturbance of the existing state of possession of 
immovables, as between two individuals.”28 Thus, it was a tool to pro-
mote and maintain order.29 According to the jus civile, the object of the 
interdict was to recognize the status quo in any given dispute involving 
immovable property,30 and was therefore designed to protect existing 
arrangements of possession without regard to the merits of the dispute. 31 
Nevertheless, possession had to be acquired from the other party nec vi, 
nec clam, nec precario, i.e., without force, secrecy, or permission.32
                                                                                                         
 23. Shaw, supra note 22, at 97. 
 
 24. See generally ORDER & JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Rosemary Foot, 
John Lewis Gaddis & Andrew Hurrell eds., 2003) (discussing the importance of order). 
 25. See BENYAMIN NEUBERGER, NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION IN POSTCOLONIAL 
AFRICA 4 (1986); Rosalyn Higgins, Grotius and the Development of International Law in 
the United Nations Period, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 267 (Hed-
ley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1992). 
 26. See generally JAMES MUIRHEAD, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIVATE LAW 
OF ROME 89–212 (Henry Goudy & Alexander Grant eds., 3d ed. 1916); JOLOWICZ & 
NICOLAS, supra note 20, at 259–63 (discussing the possessory interdicts). 
 27. Joshua Castellino & Steve Allen, The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis: Crystallization 
of Modern Post-Colonial Identity, 43 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 205, 205 (2000). 
 28. John Bassett Moore, Memorandum on Uti Possidetis: Costa Rica-Panama Arbi-
tration 1911, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 328, 328 (1944). 
 29. In the late Republic, the Praetor Urbanus was responsible for the administration 
of jus civile and the Praetor Peregrinus held the same position with regard to jus gen-
tium. See MUIRHEAD, supra note 26, at 219. 
 30. See W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO 
JUSTINIAN 205–08 (3d ed. 1963). This passage also discusses the extent to which res 
nullius can come under private ownership through occupatio, or occupation. See id. 
 31. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 5 (2003). 
 32. See JOLOWICZ & NICOLAS, supra note 20, at 259 n.2; MUIRHEAD, supra note 26, at 
315–39. 
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These restrictions on the acquisition of property by prescriptive claims 
were generally developed to ensure that the de facto possessor exercised 
his or her claim to the property as of right, and was thereby open to chal-
lenge by other interested parties.33
In contrast, the principle of terra nullius has limited contemporary sig-
nificance.
 
34
                                                                                                         
 33. See BUCKLAND, supra note 30, at 205–08. 
 Initially employed to designate territory that was empty and 
 34. The doctrine of uti possidetis juris has been referred to as recently as 1992 in the 
Badinter Commission’s treatment of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. See Matthew C.R. 
Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 333 (1995); Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 (1992). Moreover, uti 
possidetis juris has continued salience in the ICJ’s docket of contentious cases. See Terri-
torial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.) (Dec. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/14305.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Hond.) (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2008); Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90 (July 12); Applica-
tion for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua interven-
ing) (El. Sal. V. Hond.), 2002 I.C.J. 392 (Dec. 18); Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and 
Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), 2001 I.C.J. 575 (Oct. 23); Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Bots./Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13); Request for Interpretation of Judgment of 11 
June 1998 in the Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon 
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections (Nig. v. Cameroon) 1999 
I.C.J. 31 (Mar. 25); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Ca-
meroon v. Nig.: Eq. Guinea intervening), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (June 11); Maritime Delimita-
tion and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 1994 I.C.J. 
112 (July 1); Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3); Maritime Delimita-
tion in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 
14); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 
IC.J. 351 (Sept. 11); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 
53 (Nov. 12); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22); Application 
for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of 24 February 1982 in the Case Con-
cerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahirya) (Tunisia v. Libya), 1985 
I.C.J. 192 (Dec. 10); Continental Shelf (Libya /Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13 (June 3); Delimita-
tion of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 
(Oct. 12); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. 
Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 56 (Feb. 3); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3 
(Feb. 2); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); North Sea 
Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Northern Cameroons (Came-
roon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15 (Dec. 2); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 
319 (Dec. 21); South West Africa (Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21); Temple 
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J. 17 (May 26); Arbitral Award Made by 
the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 (Nov. 18); 
Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209 (June 20); Right of 
506 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
therefore free for colonization,35 terra nullius gradually took on racist 
overtones.36 In 1975, the ICJ applied terra nullius to a territory in which 
the people who inhabited it were not “socially and politically orga-
nized.”37
This broad definition of terra nullius served historically to legitimize 
the acquisition of large tracts of land throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and had a particularly adverse effect on indigenous 
 The ICJ provided legal sanction to a radically expanded defini-
tion of terra nullius—from its original meaning as “blank territory,” to 
an understanding that encompassed territory that was not empty or void 
of inhabitants. 
                                                                                                         
Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125 (Nov. 26); Minquiers and 
Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 
(Dec. 18); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights of Costa Rica on the San 
Juan River (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (Sept. 29, 2005), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/8268.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); 
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.) (Application Instituting Proceed-
ings) (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/1697.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2008); Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge (Malay./Sing.) (Special Agreement) (July 24, 2003), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/1785.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Maritime 
Delimitation Between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.) (Application 
Instituting Proceedings) (Mar. 12, 1991), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files85/6843.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Antarctica (U.K. v. Chile) (Application Insti-
tuting Proceedings) (Mar. 16, 1956), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/27/10783.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); Antarctica (U.K. v. Arg.) (Application In-
stituting Proceedings) (May 4, 1955), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/26/9065.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
  The principle of terra nullius has had continued significance in the limited context 
of ownership of the Antarctic and outer space. See Philip C. Jessup & Howard J. 
Taubenfeld, Outer Space, Antarctica, and the United Nations, 13 INT’L ORG. 363, 363 
(1959) (“Such is the case with both Antartica and with outer space. In both instances the 
absence of an indigenous population and the present inability to exploit what might be 
called natural resources serve to distinguish them from historical examples like that of 
Africa in the nineteenth century.”); Friedrich Kratochwil, Of Systems, Boundaries, and 
Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System, 39 WORLD POL. 27 
(1986) (discussing how resource regimes created by the Antarctic Treaty carefully 
avoided territorial issues between states laying claim to the land); Peter A. Toma, Soviet 
Attitude Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 611 (1956) (“[N]otably after the second World War, claims and counterclaims to 
sovereignty over these bleak lands have been numerous.”). 
 35. See Tomáš Bartoš, Uti Possidetis. Quo Vadis? 18 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 37, 44 
(1997). 
 36. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 230–33. 
 37. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (Oct. 16). 
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communities.38 Once land was acquired, boundary lines were drawn to 
demarcate ownership between settlers.39 These boundaries were even-
tually recognized as territorial demarcations on the basis of which valid 
statehood—and its accompanying right of territorial integrity—could be 
awarded.40 The system was then buffered from change in a period of 
transition by the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, which sought to maintain 
order by freezing the boundaries.41
The cumulative effect of the two doctrines of terra nullius and uti pos-
sidetis juris has been to create rigid geographic entities in a relatively 
short period of time, within which dialogue based on ownership of terri-
tory had to be framed.
 
42 To validate and legitimize an acquisition, inter-
national law brings into play the intertemporal rule, which buffers ac-
tions committed in previous eras from the scrutiny of more modern 
norms and principles.43 In this way, international law is precluded from 
raising legal questions and seeking self-correction with regard to the 
well-documented woes of colonialism.44
                                                                                                         
 38. See S.J. ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2004) (lo-
cating the position of indigenous peoples within international legal discourse). See, e.g., 
Michael Asch, From Calder to Van Der Peet: Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law, 
1973–96, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA & NEW ZEALAND 428 
(Paul Havemann ed., 1999) (examining the impact of case law and legislation concerning 
indigenous people in Canada); Willem Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the 
State in Latin America, in THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
REFORM OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 15 (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & 
André J. Hoekema eds., 1998) (examining cases studies concerning indigenous peoples in 
South America). 
 
 39. See C.H. Alexandrowicz, The Role of Treaties in the European-African Confron-
tation in the Nineteenth Century, in AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY 27 (A.K. 
Mensah-Brown ed., 1975) (illustrating this process in the African context). 
 40. See, e.g., PARTITIONED AFRICANS: RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 1884–1984 (A.I. Asiwaju ed., 1985) (examining the implication of territori-
al divisions on African identities and nations). 
 41. See Bartoš, supra note 35, at 41 (“The essence of uti possidetis is to secure re-
spect for the territorial boundaries of a newly independent State at the moment when 
independence from a colonial power is achieved.”). 
 42. See Kaikobad, Some Observations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of 
Boundaries, supra note 22 (discussing the impact of the doctrine on state creation); Ravi 
L. Kapil, On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa, 18 WORLD POL. 
656 (1966); Jesse S. Reeves, International Boundaries, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 533 (1944). 
 43. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 234–35. 
 44. See EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE 26–27, 65–66 (1981) (discussing self-
correction in the context of territoriality in international law and the Western Sahara 
Case). See also ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND 
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The international regime was reinforced by domestic legal regimes. 
Laws governing private property were simply not extended to annexed 
territories.45
I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger 
even though he may have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit 
that right. I do not admit for instance, that a great wrong has been done 
to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not 
admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a 
stronger race, a higher-grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it 
that way, has come in and taken their place.
 An infamous statement by Winston Churchill in 1937 cap-
tures the phenomenon in relation to the Palestinian claim to land: 
46
The statement reflects the racist underpinnings of the colonial impulse, 
which was justified by recourse to law and artificially created title 
deeds.
 
47
Objective analyses of the temporal rule demonstrate that rigid applica-
tion of the rule effectively precludes domestic courts from resolving 
questions over native titles
 
48
                                                                                                         
NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Hopkins Univ. Press 2001) (2000); KENNETH 
ROBERTS-WRAY, COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL LAW (1966) (documenting the laws 
that governed the Anglophone territories); William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis: The Class 
Action in International Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353 (2003); William Bradford, “With a 
Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian 
Plea for Peace With Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002); Lorie Graham, Reparations 
and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 LEGAL STUD. F. 619 (2001) (showing the difficulty 
of achieving reconciliation in the American Indian context); Byoungwook Park, Comfort 
Women During World War II: Are U.S. Courts a Final Resort for Justice?, 17 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 403 (2002) (analyzing the possibility of raising such issues before Ameri-
can courts); World Conference Against Racism (Aug. 31, 2001–Sept. 7, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/WCAR (discussing reparations for racial discrimination). 
 and reduces the principle into the handmai-
 45. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 229–38. 
 46. Arundhati Roy, Lannan Reading and Conversation: Come September (Sept. 18, 
2002) (quoting Winston Churchill’s statement in 1937), transcript available at 
http://www.lannan.org/docs/arundhati-roy-020918-trans-read.pdf). An early discussion 
concerning the treatment of native indigenous populations in the Americas arose and has 
been referred to as the Las Casas-Sepúlveda Controversy (1550–1551). See JEAN-
CLAUDE CARRIÈRE, THE CONTROVERSY OF VALLADOLID (Richard Nelson trans., Dramatist 
Play Service 2005) (capturing the issues in a play by Jean-Claude Carrière, which is set in 
a sixteenth-century Spanish monastery). 
 47. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 229–38. 
 48. See Taslim O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 285 
(1980). See generally Matthew Chapman, Indigenous Peoples and International Human 
Rights: Towards a Guarantee for the Territorial Connection, 26 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 357 
(1997); Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Com-
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den of the imperial states and their global conquests, accentuating the 
need to reexamine the legal system that legitimized these practices. 
The right to self-determination has engaged a wide range of jurists. 
However, despite the volumes written from various disciplinary perspec-
tives, the right to self-determination remains an essentially contested 
right with several meanings attributable to it. Koskenniemi sought to dis-
tinguish “romantic self-determination” from “classical self-
determination.”49
Most authorities agree that the right to self-determination derives from 
the Enlightenment era, where Jaccobean followers saw the right to de-
termine their collective destiny as an extension of the individual liberties 
each individual was assumed to have.
 However, even this broad-based analysis does not fully 
encompass the aspirations that the term conjures up, nor does it address 
the extent to which international law should play a role in catering to 
these aspirations. As a result, the more that is written about self-
determination, the more it seems to evade consensus. 
50 The right arguably came to 
prominence in international society through America’s declaration of 
independence from the British Crown and the rising up of the French 
Revolution under of the slogan of liberté, égalité, fraternité in the last 
few decades of the eighteenth century.51
                                                                                                         
parative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57 (1999) (discussing a 
legacy of conquest of various indigenous peoples). 
 
 49. See Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 249–53. The “classical school” is based on 
patriotic values and on a Hobbessean reading of international society—where a nation is 
a collection of individuals linked by a decision undertaken through a specific process, 
yielding the fruit of a mechanism that would enable it to participate in the daily affairs of 
an entity. See id. at 249. On the other hand, the “romantic” or secessionist model views 
the nation as something more fundamental than merely a decision-making procedure. See 
id. at 250. It is therefore less concerned with procedural aspects of how popular will is 
expressed and more concerned with the objective to which this will is exercised and 
whether it pertains to an appropriate manifestation of an authentic community. See id. 
 50. See KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
91–109 (2002) (discussing the origin of the discourse). See also Thomas M. Franck, The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992) (discussing the 
founding principles of self-determination in the context of democratic entitlement); Tho-
mas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND 
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Catherine Brölmann, René Lefeber & Marjoleine 
Zieck eds., 1993) (examining the doctrine in a modern and problematic context). 
 51. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, supra note 4 (illustrating 
the impact of the American declaration of independence on the doctrine of self-
determination). See generally EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1950) (regarding the American Revolution); THE FRENCH 
IDEA OF FREEDOM: THE OLD REGIME AND THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1789 (Dale 
Van Kley ed., 1994) (discussing the French Revolution). 
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Inspired by these events, the Creoles sought to forge independent states 
out of the administrative territories created under Spanish and Portuguese 
rule in South America.52 In severing their ties to Madrid and Lisbon, the 
Creoles established the basis for the modern states of Latin America, and 
unwittingly contributed to the creation of a model that would henceforth 
be used in decolonization.53
In the aftermath of World War I, U.S. President and former professor 
of political science Woodrow Wilson resuscitated the right to self-
determination, suggesting that it would be a useful indicator for recog-
nizing the democratic consent of smaller entities and nations.
 
54 He de-
termined the will of the people through a string of plebiscites in territo-
ries whose fates remained in the balance after the defeat of the Austro-
Hungarian and Ottoman empires.55
Subsequently, self-determination reemerged on the international stage 
in yet another guise during the period of decolonization. Despite use of 
the term in the U.N. Charter
 
56
                                                                                                         
 52. See HERMAN G. JAMES & PERCY A. MARTIN, THE REPUBLICS OF LATIN AMERICA 
79–109 (1923) (explaining the Creole motivations in seeking independence). See also 
WHAT JUSTICE? WHOSE JUSTICE? FIGHTING FOR FAIRNESS IN LATIN AMERICA (Susan Eva 
Eckstein & Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2003) (providing a contemporary take on 
the success of the Creole motivations). 
 and the strength of two particularly strong-
 53. JAMES & MARTIN, supra note 52 at 79–109 (discussing the modalities of this 
change and the impact on future decolonization processes). 
 54. See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY 
BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 135–78 (1996). 
 55. See WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW DEMOCRACY: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES, 
ADDRESSES, AND OTHER PAPERS (1913–1917) (Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dobbs 
eds., 1926); Anthony Whelan, Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settle-
ment, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (1994). 
 56. See U.N. Charter art. 1(2) (“To develop friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace . . . .”). In addition, article 55 
states: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect 
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United 
Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related 
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
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ly worded General Assembly resolutions,57 the meaning of self-
determination remained contested58 until General Assembly Resolution 
1541 (XV).59 The General Assembly explained that self-determination 
was a decolonization process that could result in: (1) secession of a terri-
tory to form a new state; (2) association of a territory with an existing 
state; or (3) integration of a territory into an already existing state.60 As a 
result, self-determination became the vehicle of choice for the decoloni-
zation process, even though it treated an emerging unit’s territory as 
coextensive with boundaries established during colonial rule.61
                                                                                                         
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, 
or religion. 
 
Id. art. 55. 
 57. See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 14, 1960) (“All people have 
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”) [hereinafter 
G.A. Res. 1514 (XV)]; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter 
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)]. 
 58. See Koskenniemi, supra note 11. See also DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW 
OF SELF-DETERMINATION (2002) (providing a more thorough and contemporary analysis 
of self-determination). 
 59. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) [hereinaf-
ter G.A. Res. 1541 (XV)]. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) was adopted at the 15th session of the 
U.N. General Assembly as a companion resolution to G.A. Res. 1514 (XV). Id. See also 
W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
115–28 (1977) (discussing the resolutions). 
 60. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 59, at 29. See also G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 
supra note 57 (“The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free associa-
tion or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political 
status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people.”). See also RUPERT EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION 
REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION 28–30 (Harvard Univ. Occasional Papers in 
International Affairs, No. 9, 1964) (discussing G.A. Res. 1514). See generally U.N. Econ. 
& Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of 
Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolu-
tions, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980) (prepared by Héctor Gros Espiell) 
(commenting on self-determination within the U.N.); U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on 
Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The Right to Self-Determination: 
Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Rev.1 (1981) (prepared by Aureliu Cristescu) (commenting on self-
determination within the U.N.). 
 61. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 59, at 19. See generally G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV), supra note 57, at 67 (“[A]ll peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, 
the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory . . . .”); G.A. 
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The right to self-determination was transformed from an indicator of 
political process to a right in law when it was included as the foundation-
al right in article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).62 However, despite this primacy, the 
land rights ownership component was not made explicit.63
The inclusion of the right to self-determination in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations further reflected the ascent of self-determination in public inter-
national law.
 
64 Many classify the right to self-determination as a norm of 
jus cogens, even though the phrasing of the Declaration itself clearly lim-
its application of the doctrine to decolonization, with certain other claw-
backs over territorial integrity that leave the real application relatively 
ambiguous.65
Despite these points of consensus, vital questions remain: (1) whether 
the right to self-determination has any validity in post-colonial interna-
tional society;
 
66
                                                                                                         
Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 57, at 123 (“[A]ll peoples have the right freely to deter-
mine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Charter.”). 
 (2) who is entitled to claim a right to self-determination; 
 62. See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 63. See DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 14–16 (1991) (dis-
cussing the initial reluctance to accept self-determination as a legal rather than a political 
right due to its vague and undefined nature). See generally SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY (2000). 
 64. See G.A. 2625 (XXV), supra note 57, at 123. See also Ian Sinclair, The Signific-
ance of the Friendly Relations Declarations, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 1 
(Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1994) (explaining the importance of the 1970 
Declaration); Patrick Thornberry, The Principle of Self-Determination, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL 
AKEHURST 175 (Vaughan Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1994) (giving insight into the 
inclusion of self-determination as one of the identified principles). 
 65. See G.A. 2625 (XXV), supra note 57. See generally Sinclair, supra note 64 (ex-
plaining the importance of the 1970 Declaration). 
 66. “Colonization” appears to refer to European subjugation of non-European 
peoples. “Decolonization” is therefore the process whereby European countries ceded 
this dominance over non-European peoples. These concepts, narrowly defined, do not 
directly extend to the context of indigenous peoples. See F. VAN LANGENHOVE, THE 
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and (3) how the legal norm may need to be tempered to the political real-
ities.67
II. THE THEORY AND LAW GOVERNING THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
To understand the legal framework governing the acquisition of territo-
ry, it is worthwhile to recall the historical antecedents fundamental to the 
development of jus gentium, or the law of nations, itself.68
The Greeks made very important advances in the science of law, but 
they never attained to the consistent doctrine or the logical practice 
which the Romans built up. To begin with, they did not possess . . . a 
term corresponding to the Roman ius, the ordered system of which an 
individual lex is merely an example. . . . Moreover, the universality of 
law was far from being recognized. . . . The idea that law has a com-
mon application to all persons within a political territory was alien to 
the Greeks. The idea of a universal ius gentium was not yet born. 
 In assessing 
Greek and Roman contributions to the development of international law, 
MacIver stated in 1926: 
. . . 
It was Rome that liberated the universality of law, that transcended the 
sophistic antithesis between nature and convention, and that first em-
bodied in one comprehensive and unified code the distinctive order of 
the state.69
For MacIver, the first real departure point for the emergence of jus 
gentium occurred when Rome liberated itself from the famous Twelve 
Tablets.
 
70 While Rome may have premised the liberation on the need to 
preserve the special rights of Roman citizens in distinction to aliens,71
                                                                                                         
QUESTION OF ABORIGINES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS: THE BELGIAN THESIS (1954) 
(discussing the Belgian Thesis and its relation to indigenous peoples). 
 the 
 67. See CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL “NATIONAL” IDENTITY, supra note 15, at 43. 
 68. For a historical analysis of the development of international law in the context of 
title to territory, see GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 289–309 (3d ed. 
1957) and GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 43–59 
(1962). 
 69. R.M. MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE 103–05 (1926). 
 70. See MUIRHEAD, supra note 26, at 89–97. The Twelve Tablets were inscribed in 
stone as the first form of codified Roman law after a study of the laws of Greece and 
Greek cities of Italy. See id. at 89–90. They became the basis of jus civile in Rome and 
were applicable to all Roman citizens. See id. at 82. 
 71. See MACIVER, supra note 69, at 106. 
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principles under the jurisdiction and judgment of the Praetor Peregrinus 
gradually took on a complexity that made them superior in many respects 
to jus gentium.72 However, like much colonial law, jus gentium devel-
oped in the intellectual circles of the capital and was accepted as univer-
sal simply by virtue of its having been so deemed.73
It is important to understand these origins of jus gentium in order to 
understand the doctrines that have subsequently become fundamental 
constraints governing the treatment of territory under international law. 
These doctrines originated in a distinct cultural context that is not the 
same in all the diverse communities across the globe. As a result, the 
doctrines inevitably fail to take into account complexities that are partic-
ularly germane to notions of identity and territory. Oppenheim’s Interna-
tional Law highlights the lack of unanimity among members of the inter-
national community vis-à-vis the modes of territorial acquisition. This, 
however, is attributed to the fact that the concept of state territory has 
changed considerably from the times of Grotius, through the Middle 
Ages, and to contemporary society.
 
74
[T]he acquisition of territory by a state normally means the acquisition 
of sovereignty over such territory. In these circumstances the Roman 
law scheme of “modes” concerning the acquisition of private property 
are no longer wholly appropriate.
 Therefore: 
75
Irrespective of the distinction between historical acquisition of territo-
ry—based more on private modes of acquisition—and contemporary ac-
quisition of territory—occurring under greater international scrutiny—
the modes of acquisition remain the same in the annals of public interna-
tional law:
 
76
                                                                                                         
 72. See id. at 107. 
 
 73. See id. at 106; Alexandrowicz, The Role of Treaties in the European-African Con-
frontation in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 39, at 35–36, 61–63. Also like the co-
lonial law that was to follow in later centuries, distinctions were made between the rights 
of citizens and the rights of subjects. See id. Perhaps the most explicit example of these 
distinctions concern the system of capitulations that were put in place to safeguard the 
rights of citizens of the metropolitan states (i.e., the colonizing state) when working 
abroad. See id. 
 74. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE 678–79 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE]. 
 75. Id. at 679. 
 76. See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA (1979) (providing an authoritative and comprehensive view of the 
theory and practice behind the acquisition of African territory and boundaries in public 
international law). Compared to territorial acquisition, territory can be lost through six 
modes—the corresponding five modes of acquisition and, in addition, the loss of territory 
2008] TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 515 
(1) Cession: A state acquires territory through transfer of sove-
reignty by the “owner state;”77
(2) Occupation: A state appropriates territory over which another 
state is not sovereign;
 
78
(3) Accretion: A state acquires territory through natural or artifi-
cial formations, without violating another state’s sovereignty;
 
79
(4) Subjugation: A state acquires territory through conquest and 
subsequent annexation, where war-making is a sovereign right, 
and not illegal;
 
80
                                                                                                         
through revolt or dereliction. See also OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra 
note 74, at 716–18. 
 
 77. See JENNINGS, supra note 10, at 16–19; J.H.W. VERZIJL, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 11–13 (1970). See also OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
PEACE, supra note 74, at 679–82 (explaining that cession may take different forms, in-
cluding the sale of territory, as occurred in Alaska in 1867 and the Danish West Indies in 
1916). One example of a cession is the giving of Bombay by the Portuguese to the British 
in 1661 as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, who married Charles II. See An-
thony Farrington, Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 52 HIST. TODAY 
40, 40 (2002). 
 78. See generally ARTHUR S. KELLER, OLIVER J. LISSITZYN & FREDERICK J. MANN, 
CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH SYMBOLIC ACTS 1400–1800 (1938); 
NORMAN HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 146–49 
(1944). 
 79. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 696–98. Accre-
tion would include the construction of embankments, breakwaters, and dykes while also 
covering the augmentation of territory through natural processes such as alluvions, deltas, 
emerging islands, and abandoned river beds. Id. 
 80. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112–
22 (1963). See also Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in 
the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salva-
dor/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (El. Sal. v. Hond.), 2002 I.C.J. 392 (Dec. 18) 
(illustrating a modern revision claim based on avulsion). El Salvador’s revision claim 
was based on the avulsion of the river Gaoscorán, in addition to the Carta Esférica and 
the report of the 1794 El Activo expedition. Id. at 401. To open revision proceedings, all 
the conditions contained in article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ need to be fulfilled. See 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 61, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 
U.N.T.S. 933. The application must be based on “discovery of some fact of such a nature 
as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown . . . 
not due to negligence.” Id. art. 61(1). In addition, the application must be made within six 
months after the new fact is discovered and within ten years after the original judgment. 
Id. art. 61(4)–(5). In the application for revision of the Land, Island and Maritime Fron-
tier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), the Chamber found that El 
Salvador’s request for revision did not satisfy the conditions set down in article 61 on the 
basis that the facts alleged were not new facts in the sense intended by article 61. Appli-
cation for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning the 
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(5) Prescription: A state acquires territory through continuous 
and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over the territory.81
Of these modes of acquisition, the two that merit further discussion in 
terms of the doctrinal tools governing territoriality—especially in ex-
amining the nexus between self-determination and territoriality—are oc-
cupation and subjugation. 
 
“Occupation,” as discussed in this context, is considered an original 
mode of acquisition, and is therefore different from the mode whereby a 
state takes control of a territory by military force.82 Rather, occupation 
must be performed by the state while serving a state function, or the state 
must acknowledge the act upon performance.83 Occupation has two es-
sential elements: possession and administration.84 First, the territory in 
question must be terra nullius, or unoccupied by a state, at the moment 
of possession:85
The only territory which can be the object of occupation is that which 
does not already belong to any state, whether it is uninhabited, or inha-
bited by persons whose community is not considered to be a state; for 
individuals may live on a territory without forming themselves into a 
 
                                                                                                         
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua interven-
ing) (El. Sal. v. Hond.), 2002 I.C.J. at 409–11. 
 81. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 705–08 (reflect-
ing the views of leading international jurists in the historical evolution of this concept). 
 82. See id. at 686–87. Interestingly, the discussion of occupation during times of war 
is contained in an altogether separate volume of these legal annals. See OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts 
eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
 83. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 687. 
 84. Id. at 688. “Real” occupation is differentiated from “fictitious” occupation with 
the former labeled “effective” occupation. Id. 
 85. The possession element is reflected in recent Australian case law. See, e.g., Mabo 
v. Queensland II (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.) (discussing the status of Australian territo-
ry and its relationship to the aboriginal populations that lived on it at the time of coloniza-
tion, in the specific context of a case raised by Eddie Mabo). The reasoning in this case 
was central to the overturning of 200 years of precedent. See ESSAYS ON THE MABO 
DECISION (1993); Julie Cassidy, Observations on Mabo & Ors v. Queensland, 1 DEAKIN 
L. REV. 37 (1994); Michael Legg, Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial 
Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 387, 408–10 (2002) 
(capturing a discussion that began when the U.N. Committee for the Elimination of Ra-
cial Discrimination took objection to Australia’s Native Title Act); Gary D. Meyers & 
John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition, 
23 ENVTL L. 1203, 1204–05 (1993) (providing an analysis of the impact of the Mabo 
decision); Gerry Simpson, Mabo, International Law, Terra Nullius and the Stories of 
Settlement: An Unresolved Jurisprudence, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 195 (1993). See also 
PETER BUTT & ROBERT EAGLESON, MABO, WIK & NATIVE TITLE (3d ed. 1998) (1993) 
(providing a plain English explanation of the court’s reasoning). 
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state proper exercising sovereignty over such territory. The territory of 
any state however is obviously not a possible object of occupation; and 
it can only be acquired through cession or, formerly, by subjugation.86
Thus, individuals may live on a territory without organizing themselves 
into proper states that exercise sovereignty over the territory. Therefore, 
the relatively objective criterion concerning occupation, i.e., terra nul-
lius, has been altered by a subjective element that considers the kind of 
social and political organization that may exist within a territory. This 
reading of the doctrine of occupation has dominated cases concerning 
territoriality in international law. For example, in the Western Sahara 
Case, the ICJ determined that the Saharawis were not “socially and polit-
ically organized,”
 
87 and therefore were not occupants of the western part 
of the Sahara.88
Even when possession by the occupying state has been recognized, the 
occupying state must also establish administration over the entire territo-
ry.
 
89 Thus, for an occupation to be an effective title-generating acquisi-
tion, “it is necessary that . . . [the occupying state] should take the territo-
ry under its sway (corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty 
over it (animus).”90 There must be some degree of settlement, accompa-
nied by a formal act that announces the act of occupation and the deter-
mination to extend sovereignty over the territory.91 The second element 
then flows from the first; the occupying state must establish a form of 
administration that reveals the occupying state’s exercise of sovereignty 
in the territory. The failure to extend administrative regimes over the ter-
ritory would bring into question the effectiveness of the occupation and, 
in theory, would leave the territory open to acquisition by other sove-
reigns.92
In many circumstances, twentieth century colonial flags were raised 
over newly demarcated territories without effective control over all inha-
bitants,
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 86. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 687 (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
 and thus acquisition of inhabited territory based on a subjective 
 87. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 39 (Oct. 16). 
 88. See id. at 83–102 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun). 
 89. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 688–89. 
 90. Id. at 689. This notion itself derives directly from the Roman law governing pri-
vate property. See generally W.W. BUCKLAND & A. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON 
LAW: A COMPARISON OUTLINE 70 (2d ed. 1952). 
 91. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 689. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See KORMAN, supra note 54, at 41–66 (discussing the rights of so-called Euro-
pean states and “barbarian” political communities.). Robert Jackson has advanced a simi-
lar point in a more contemporary context, suggesting that many states in Africa could be 
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determination of the inhabitants’ society was compounded by a failure to 
respect the conditions necessary to generate titular or possessory rights. 
While it could be argued that the colonization of Africa and, to a lesser 
extent, of Asia94 occurred in the shadow of the dubious rule adopted by 
the Berlin West Africa Congress of 1899, which permitted claims to con-
tiguous territories based on possession of the coast, the action in the 
Americas clearly predates this rule.95
Subjugation, the other principal means of acquisition, occurs through 
conquest and subsequent acquisition, where war is a sovereign right. To 
acquire a territory through subjugation: (1) the conquering power must 
establish conquest, (2) the state of war must have ended, and (3) the con-
quering power must formally annex the territory.
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considered quasi-states on very similar grounds. See Robert Jackson, Juridical Statehood 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT’L AFF. 17 (1992). Jackson’s work on this issue in the 
context of the African state was controversial. See GROVOGUI, supra note 19, at 182–84. 
However, it has salience in terms of indigenous peoples who live in isolatation and are 
therefore only notionally subjects of the territorial states that claim jurisdiction over 
them. The classic examples of this are the indigenous peoples in the Amazon. See Gav-
ney Moore & Maria Carmen Lemos, Indigenous Policy in Brazil: The Development of 
Decree 1775 & the Proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve, Roraima, Brazil, 21 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 444 (1999); Maria G. M. Rodrigues, Indigenous Rights in Democratic Brazil, 24 
HUM. RTS. Q. 487 (2002). 
 This method of acqui-
sition predominated in Latin America, but was not otherwise frequently 
 94. For a treatise on the colonization of Asia, see HARRY G. GELBER, NATIONS OUT OF 
EMPIRES: EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ASIA (2001) (linking 
the events taking place in Europe with their impact in Asian colonization and concluding 
with some well thought-out ironies). 
 95. See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. See also THE SCRAMBLE FOR 
AFRICA: DOCUMENTS ON THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE AND RELATED 
SUBJECTS 1884/1885 (R.J. Gavin & J.A. Betley eds., 1973); Antony Allott, Boundaries in 
Africa: A Legal and Historical Survey, in AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY 69 
(A.K. Mensah-Brown ed., 1975). 
 96. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 699. Subjugation is 
explained as follows: 
At no period did conquest alone and ipso facto make the conquering state the 
territorial sovereign of the conquered territory, even though such territory came 
through conquest for the time being under the sway of the conqueror. Conquest 
was a mode of acquisition only if the conqueror, after having firmly established 
the conquest, and the state of war having come to an end, then formally an-
nexed the territory. If a belligerent conquered part of the enemy territory and 
afterwards made the vanquished state cede the conquered territory in the treaty 
of peace the mode of acquisition was not subjugation but cession. Such a treaty 
of cession, however, would now be qualified by article 52 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties . . . . 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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employed. Title by subjugation was rare because the conquering power 
typically enforced a treaty of cession and article 10 of the League of Na-
tions Covenant outlawed war waged for territorial acquisition.97 While 
not suggesting that wars occurring before the passage of article 10 of the 
League of Nations Covenant were legal,98 many jurists appear to assume 
that such events are beyond blame since they are subject to the intertem-
poral rule of law.99 Although the tendency to borrow principles from 
domestic law has pervaded and developed much of international law,100 
respect for property, central to property law regimes in colonial states, 
was not extended to cover the acquisition of territories beyond the met-
ropolitan state.101 It has been suggested that the signing of treaties ceding 
subjugated territories would only now be qualified by article 52 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which invalidates any treaty 
produced through the threat or use of force in violation of international 
law.102
                                                                                                         
 97. Id. See also League of Nations Covenant art. 10. 
 
 98. See Christine Gray, The Use of Force and the International Legal Order, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 589 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 2006). See generally CHRISTINE 
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE USE OF FORCE 24–50 (2000). 
 99. Literature on international law is surprisingly silent on the aftermath of coloniza-
tion. While there are considerable sources that comment on the self-determination aspect 
of this process, very few seek to examine the impact of this principle on the domestic 
polities created. This is perhaps justifiable because it is a greater concern for human 
rights literature. However, even a glance at the index pages of human rights journals 
shows that relatively scant attention is paid to the extent to which effective political par-
ticipation, or true decolonization, has actually occurred within post-colonial states. In 
sharp contrast, in the 1960s international society scrutinized decolonization almost as 
intensely as the current development of modern international criminal law. 
 100. See infra Part III.A (discussing the injection of jus civile principles into jus gen-
tium in the context of the origins of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris). 
 101. See generally CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 29–56. It could be argued that the devel-
opment of domestic property regimes, along with international law principles as framed 
here, would have prevented the acquisition of territory through wars. If such wars were 
nonetheless waged, any unequal or unfair treaties of cession would be similarly invali-
dated based on domestic contract law, which frames the laws governing treaties. 
 102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is titled 
“Coercion of a State by Threat or Use of Force,” and states: “A treaty is void if its con-
clusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of 
international law embedded in the Charter of the United Nations.” Id. In the context of 
colonization, colonial powers could argue that the entity coming under colonization was 
not a state, and therefore beyond the remit of such protection. However, this defense, and 
the argument that the Vienna Convention of 1969 differs from the standard prevailing at 
the time of colonization, remain unconvincing in light of the intent of the drafters. See 
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III. THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF THE DOCTRINES OF UTI POSSIDETIS 
JURIS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRA NULLIUS 
Though the principle of terra nullius was derived from jus gentium and 
has been inscribed in the annals of international law, it came to promi-
nence in the context of the European expansion into the Americas.103 
This episode in human history also contributed to the evolution of the 
doctrine of uti possidetis juris.104 However, uti possidetis juris was bor-
rowed from jus civile rather than jus gentium.105 Uti possidetis juris be-
came the cornerstone of the right to self-determination in the aftermath 
of the Creole struggle, in which the Creoles, of European descent, sought 
Latin American emancipation from the aegis of colonial rule from Madr-
id and Lisbon.106
Alejandro Alvarez, writing in the early part of the last century, ex-
pressed the relationship between Europe and the states of the New 
World, while also revealing the racism that underpinned the project: 
 
Europe is formed of men of a single race, the white; while Latin Amer-
ica is composed of a native population to which in colonial times was 
added in varying proportions an admixture of the conquering race and 
emigrants from the mother country, negroes imported from Africa, and 
the creoles, that is those born in America but of European parents. Out 
of this amalgamation of races (the aborigines, the whites, and the ne-
groes, together with the creole element), the Latin-American continent 
presented an ethnical product which was no less peculiar than its physi-
cal environment. The resultant colonial society . . . is completely sui 
generis; in it the whites, born in the mother country, although in the 
minority, exercised the control and guided a multitude which was in 
great part illiterate and ignorant.107
                                                                                                         
generally THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES 
361–69 (1978). 
 
 103. See generally BEATRIZ PASTOR BODMER, THE ARMATURE OF CONQUEST: SPANISH 
ACCOUNTS OF THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 1492–1589 (Lydia Longstreth Hunt trans., 
Stanford Univ. Press 1992) (1983). 
 104. See CARLOS A. PARODI, THE POLITICS OF SOUTH AMERICAN BOUNDARIES 5–8 
(2002) (outlining the genesis of the application of the doctrine to the Americas). 
 105. See Bartoš, supra note 35, at 39. See generally COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, 1 THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 69–72 (1911) (ex-
plaining jus civile and jus gentium). 
 106. See generally MARIANO PICÓN-SALAS, A CULTURAL HISTORY OF SPANISH 
AMERICA FROM CONQUEST TO INDEPENDENCE (Irving A. Leonard trans., Univ. of Cal. 
1962) (1944). 
 107. Alejandro Alvarez, Latin America and International Law, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 269, 
271 (1909) (reflecting the prevalent attitudes of the time). 
2008] TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 521 
Nearly one hundred years later, the fault lines identified by Alvarez 
persist in the form of “preferential hiring and credit practices, racial pro-
filing by law enforcement agencies and insufficient allocation of gov-
ernment resources in the public sector.”108 With some important token 
exceptions in Brazil, Cuba, and Venezuela, the indigenous and African-
American populations make up the poorest strata of the region’s national 
societies.109 These populations grapple with limited access to key socio-
economic rights, such as education, health, and employment.110 African-
American populations are additionally disadvantaged because many 
emerging states fail to recognize them as distinct minorities.111
                                                                                                         
 108. See MAURICE BRYN, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L, STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
MINORITIES 2007: EVENTS OF 2006, at 62 (2007). 
 
 109. See id. This is consistently recorded in state reports that are submitted to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) and the Human Rights 
Committee (“HRC”). See U.N. Comm. On the Elmination of Racial Discrimination 
[CERD], Eighteenth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2004: Venezuela, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/476/Add.4 (Oct. 7, 2004) (regarding Venezuela); U.N. CERD, Seven-
teenth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2002: Brazil, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/431/Add.8 (Oct. 16, 2003) (regarding Brazil); U.N. CERD, Thirteenth Periodic 
Report of States Parties Due in 1997: Cuba, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/319/Add.4 (Oct. 7, 
1997) (regarding Cuba). See also U.N. CERD, Concluding Observations of the Commit-
tee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Venezuela, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/VEN/CO/18 (Mar. 27, 2007); U.N. CERD, Concluding Observations of the 
Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Brazil, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/64/CO/2 (Apr. 28, 2004) (reiterating CERD’s concern as expressed in its pre-
vious concluding observations of “the persistence of deep structural inequalities affecting 
black and mestizo communities and indigenous peoples”); U.N. CERD, Concluding Ob-
servations of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Cuba, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.60 (Feb. 10, 1999). 
 110. See BRYN, supra note 108, at 62. 
 111. See id. at 63 (“[T]his is essentially a reflection of their de facto invisibility as a 
population group.”). None of the national constitutions of Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, 
Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay recognize African descendants living in 
America as distinct cultural groups. See id. Interestingly, the indigenous autonomous 
regime in Oaxaca, Mexico is one of the first to provide such recognition for the commu-
nity, officially recognizing Afro-Mexicans as a distinct group. See generally Alejandro 
Anaya-Muñoz, Multicultural Legislation and Indigenous Autonomy in Oaxaxa, Mexico, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 225 (Joshua Castellino & Niamh 
Walsh eds., 2005). 
  More recently, advocacy groups have made a concerted effort to push for such 
recognition, and there has been increased political participation. African-American 
groups are beginning to exert some pressure on governments to remedy the lack of rec-
ognition in Venezuela, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and Peru. See BRYN, 
supra note 108, at 63. In 2002, Brazil appointed four Afro-Brazilian national ministers. 
Id. In 2004, three Afro-Peruvians were elected to the Congress of Peru. In 2005, Suri-
name voters elected eight Afro-descendant Maroon representatives, including three cabi-
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European entry into South America was facilitated by the expanded 
understanding of terra nullius characteristic of the colonial era, which 
was premised on the notion that the indigenous peoples inhabiting the 
continent were not socially and politically organized.112 However, in 
their attempted emancipation from European influence, the Creoles 
formed an intellectual élite.113 The Creoles who struggled for the right to 
self-determination relied on their European values and education, and 
were inspired by eighteenth century philosophical writings.114 This élite 
mobilized and took advantage of the setbacks to Spain in its bid for inde-
pendence in the Napoleonic Wars.115 In asserting and achieving their in-
dependence, the new Creole élite maintained that their actions were a 
natural consequence of their individual liberty, giving them the right to 
form sovereign states.116 This “right” was distinguished from a struggle 
for civil liberties; in their eyes, the struggle was instead an act of interna-
tional war.117
The Creole action does not really fit within the theoretical modes of 
acquisition described in the previous section. Rather, it could be argued 
that the Creole emancipation of South American territories was consti-
tuted under the norm of freedom from subjugation. No new territory was 
acquired; it was merely the ousting of a previous regime by its sub-
jects.
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net positions. Id. Afro-Ecuadorians have also gained more visibility in Ecuadorian poli-
tics. Id. 
 The international law precedent was captured in jus resistendi ac 
  However, the risk of racial profiling remains high. Id. at 65–66. Moreover, there 
is significant incarceration of African-American populations across the region, id., and 
incarcerated African-Americans are at higher risk of torture. See, e.g., id. (discussing a 
U.N. Special Rapporteur’s report on torture in Brazilian prisons). See also U.N. 
ECOSOC, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of 
Torture and Detention, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/66/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2001) (prepared by 
Nigel S. Rodley). Furthermore, African-Americans are often more affected in times of 
conflict than the rest of the population. See, e.g., id. at 66–67 (explaining the effects of 
conflict in Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas). 
 112. See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). See also 
CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 66–67; supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 113. See MARK A. BURKHOLDER & LYMAN L. JOHNSON, COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA 196 
(3d ed. 1998). 
 114. See generally id. at 195–98 (discussing the Creole motivations). 
 115. See D.A. BRADING, CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND CREOLE PATRIOTISM: SIMÓN 
BOLÍVAR (1783–1830) AND THE SPANISH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 (1983). 
 116. See Alvarez, supra note 107, at 274–75. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See generally PARODI, supra note 104 (outlining how the Creoles saw the need to 
create boundaries as a crucial part of the ousting of the old regime and the ushering in of 
the new). 
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secessionis, i.e., the right of resistance and the right of secession.119 
While it is questionable whether this principle provides an adequate basis 
for the Creole action, the Creole action must nevertheless be distin-
guished from the French Revolution, from which the Creoles drew inspi-
ration.120 While the French Revolution was a struggle to establish liberté, 
égalite, fraternité among all French subjects,121 Latin American decolo-
nization should be viewed as a triumph of territoriality over identity. 122 
Further, this model of self-determination—rather than the French or 
American Revolutions, which are often touted as precursors of modern 
self-determination—truly became the modus operandi of modern deco-
lonization.123
The doctrine of uti possidetis juris and the principle of terra nullius 
were invoked following the Creole emancipation as the newly emerging 
regimes sought to consolidate the territory within their jurisdiction, while 
sending out a clear message against reconquista.
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 119. See NEUBERGER, supra note 25, at 4 (regarding jus resistendi ac secessionis). 
 The Creoles worked 
together to create a strong legal buttress against further European interest 
on the continent, despite two fundamental challenges: (1) the difficulty 
of boundary demarcation between the emerging states (the intracontinen-
tal threat to territory); and (2) the threat that parts of the territory that 
were not effectively occupied by the new sovereigns could fall prey to 
 120. See generally Alvarez, supra note 107, at 274–75 (discussing the Creole action). 
 121. See Joshua Castellino, Liberty, Fraternity and Equality: The Dubious Fruits of 
“National” Self-Determination in International Law, 1 TURKU L.J. 1 (1999) (discussing 
the relationship between the French Revolution and the international notion of self-
determination). See generally EDMUND BURKE, FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Daniel E. Ritchie ed., 1992) (illustrating the guiding spirit of the 
French Revolution); Charles Tilly, Revolutions and Collective Violence, in 3 HAND BOOK 
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, METROPOLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY 483 (Fred I. Greenstein & 
Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975) (discussing what constitutes a revolution). 
 122. In the U.N. decolonization process, the closest triumph would be the attempt by 
the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia (precursor to the modern Zimbabwe) to seize 
power from the British. See also In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] A.C. 211 (P.C. 1918). 
The English Court of Appeals’ application of terra nullius to indigenous peoples was 
based on the notion of native peoples that were “so low in the scale of social organiza-
tion” that “it would be idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to 
our law and then to transmute it into the substance of transferable rights of property as we 
know them.” Id. at 234–34. 
 123. See generally A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF THE UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1973). 
 124. That is, against being colonized again. See Alvarez, supra note 107, at 290, 310–
12. 
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external interest and conquest (or the intercontinental threat to territo-
ry).125
A. The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis Juris: A Sword Against Intra-
Continental Territorial Rivalries 
 
In response to the first challenge, the newly emerging states sought to 
demarcate geographical boundaries within their constitutions, so they 
could rely on codified law in any subsequent challenge.126 Through this 
process, it was believed that title could be extended to parts of the state 
that may or may not have been under effective control, but were believed 
to be integral to the new state. Fully aware that territorial disputes were 
likely to arise, the newly emerging states also attempted to create ge-
nuine cooperation among the new community of states in the form of 
regional defense and cooperation pacts.127
The adoption of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris was fundamental to 
these agreements in terms of understanding the territorial regimes that 
were inherited by the new sovereigns.
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 125. See id. 
 The Creole adoption of the doc-
 126. See BURKHOLDER & JOHNSON, supra note 113, at 315–39 (detailing how this codi-
fication manifests itself in the context of each of the emerging states). 
 127. See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. inter-
vening), 1992 IC.J. 351, 357 (Sept. 11) (discussing the Constitution of El Salvador 1981); 
Charles G. Fenwick, The Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro, 
36 AM. J. INT’L L. 169, 183 (1942) (“[T]he Meeting of Foreign Ministers had been called 
primarily with the object of discussing practical measures to be taken for continental 
defense.”); Josef L. Kunz, Guatemala vs. Great Britain: In re Belice, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 
383 (1946) (discussing a treaty that established the frontiers between British Honduras 
and Guatemala in 1859); The First Pan-American Scientific Congress, 2 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 441, 442 (1908) (identifying territorial boundaries as one theme of the congress); 
William Manger, The Pan American Union at the Sixth International Conference of 
American States, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 764 (1928). 
 128. The interim nature of this co-operation is particularly visible in the recent volume 
of cases concerning territoriality and contested boundary delimitations in the context of 
South America. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.) (Dec. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/14305.pdf; Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.) (Oct. 8, 
2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2008); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights of Costa Rica on the San Juan 
River (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (Sept. 29, 2005), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/8268.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008); 
Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 September 1992 in the Case Concerning 
the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua inter-
vening) (El. Sal. v. Hond.), 2002 I.C.J. 392 (Dec. 18); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 IC.J. 351 (Sept. 11); Arbitral Award 
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trine of uti possidetis juris in terms of international property resolved 
issues of jus gentium by recourse to a norm developed in jus civile that 
sought to arbitrate between individuals.129 Thus, the notion of national 
territory was reduced to the realm of a contest between two individuals to 
private property. In a further misinterpretation of the original doctrine, 
the distinction between uti possidetis de jure and uti possidetis de facto 
was lost.130 Under jus civile, disputed property was considered to be in 
the incumbent’s de facto possession while a determination of the de jure 
claim to that property’s title was undertaken.131 Thus, uti possidetis de 
facto merely recognized the incumbent’s actual possession of the proper-
ty, which may or may not have been later deemed uti possidetis de jure, 
depending on the resolution of the dispute. Thus, uti possidetis de facto 
was merely a position in abeyance of the Roman praetor’s final deci-
sion.132
The Creole adoption of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, however, 
did not contain such a nuanced interpretation. Rather, it treated the terri-
tory within the inherited boundaries as being within the de facto, as well 
as de jure, possession of the new incumbent. In so doing, the doctrine 
established the all-important notion of the “critical date,”
 
133 which be-
came the cut-off point that crystallized possession of a territory and de-
termined the identity of its de jure possessor.134
                                                                                                         
Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192 
(Nov. 18). 
 The critical date has be-
  Cases over claims to the Antarctic by South American states, while not directly 
relevant, nonetheless show the extent to which these states envision the notion of territo-
riality. See Antarctica (U.K. v. Chile) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (Mar. 16, 
1956), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/27/10783.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2008); Antarctica (U.K. v. Arg.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (May 4, 1955), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/26/9065.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
  It is instructive to note that in each of the cases, the parties either explicitly or 
implicitly accepted the importance of the uti possidetis juris line. Indeed, it could be ar-
gued that the entrenchment of the doctrinal package in modern jurisprudence concerning 
territoriality derives from this large-scale acceptance of the application of the doctrine in 
times of transition. 
 129. See generally CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 29–89 (discussing Roman property re-
gimes and the Creole action in Latin America). 
 130. See Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 
supra note 22, at 100. 
 131. Ratner, supra note 22, at 592–93. 
 132. See Castellino & Allen, The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis: Crystallization of Modern 
Post-Colonial Identity, supra note 27, at 209. 
 133. For an early articulation of this principle, see L.F.E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1251 (1963). 
 134. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1996 I.C.J. 554, 586–87 (Dec. 22). 
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come a central feature in territorial disputes between states, and its mod-
ern interpretation follows the line first articulated by Judge Huber in Isl-
and of Palmas (or Miangas) (United States v. Netherlands)135
If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a portion of territory, it is 
customary to examine which of the States claiming sovereignty pos-
sesses a title—cession, conquest, occupation, etc.—superior to that 
which the other State might possibly bring forward against it. However, 
if the contestation is based on the fact that the other Party has actually 
displayed sovereignty, it cannot be sufficient to establish the title by 
which territorial sovereignty was validly acquired at a certain moment; 
it must also be shown that the territorial sovereignty has continued to 
exist and did exist at the moment which for the decision of the dispute 
must be considered as critical.
 nearly a 
century after its first use in Latin American decolonization: 
136
When read in conjunction with the critical date—determined in the case 
of the Creole emancipation as the departure of the colonial ruler—the de 
jure title to the new territories was handed over to the new incumbents 
based on the administrative lines drawn by the departing colonial re-
gimes. The new sovereign exercised sovereignty over the territory, and 
the claim of any aspirant sovereign was dismissed as being disruptive of 
the peace.
 
137 This constituted a clear deviation from the Roman law dik-
tat, which merely estopped aspirant claims until they could be ana-
lyzed.138 Instead, the doctrine of uti possidetis juris is more akin to the 
children’s playground justice of “finder’s keepers,”139 or its more sophis-
ticated legal sobriquet, “possession is nine-tenths of the law.”140
The interpretation of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris in its current 
guise offers the international community a useful bulwark for the protec-
tion of order.
 
141 The ICJ and other judicial bodies142
                                                                                                         
 135. Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 have consistently 
 136. Id. at 839. See also Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland Case 
(Nor. v. Den.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Aug. 3) (an early interpretation illustrat-
ing the ICJ’s subsequent articulation of the idea). 
 137. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 10. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Armory v. Delamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (the leading case on the 
“finder’s keepers” rule). 
 140. See generally CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION (1961); Henry W. 
Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135 (1919). 
 141. See BULL, supra note 2, at 4. Bull defines order as an arrangement of life that 
promotes given goals and values. Three goals essential to order are: (1) security against 
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used the doctrine in cases concerning territoriality. With its clear empha-
sis on maintaining the status quo, the doctrine of uti possidetis juris can 
be used to restrict conflict and consolidate de facto positions in a moment 
of transition or at the end of hostilities, even sanctifying them with the 
grant of territorial sovereignty.143 The fate of territories can be judicially 
determined on the grounds of physical evidence of possession at the crit-
ical date, rather than on more complicated factors, such as contested his-
tories, tribal affiliations, or social cohesion within a territorial unit.144
However, the inevitable result is that the critical date, usually an arbi-
trary point based on when the colonial ruler departed, becomes the de-
termining factor for modern statehood,
 
145 even though the emerging 
state’s territory may have been unified by a colonial power through the 
belligerent use of force for a limited period of time.146
                                                                                                         
violence, (2) assurance that promises are maintained, and (3) stable possession of proper-
ty. See id. 
 No flexibility is 
 142. Most notably, the Badinter Arbitration Committee was first set up to arbitrate 
between the different Yugoslav Republics, but ended up as the body charged with the 
dissolution of the state. See generally STEVE TERRETT, THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA 
AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION (2000); Peter Radan, Secession and Self-
Determination: The Case of Slovenia and Croatia, 48 AUSTL. J. INT’L L. 183 (1994); 
Radan, Post-Succession International Orders: A Critical Analysis of the Workings of the 
Badinter Commission, supra note 21. 
 143. See John Agnew, Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, 
Identity and Movement in World Politics, 28 MILLENNIUM J. INT’L STUD. 499 (1999). See 
generally HELEN GHEBREWEBET, IDENTIFYING UNITS OF STATEHOOD AND DETERMINING 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES (2006). 
 144. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 119–55 (analyzing ICJ jurisprudence). See also Joshua Cas-
tellino, Territoriality and Identity in International Law: The Struggle for Self-
Determination in the Western Sahara, 28 MILLENNIUM J. INT’L STUD. 523 (1999). 
 145. Cf. Nuno Sérgio Marques Antunes, The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: First Stage—
The Law of Title to Territory Re-Averred, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 362, 363–65 (1999) 
(evidencing an entity, Eritrea, that was designated as separate by a colonial ruler, and 
subsequently became a separate sovereign state despite earlier history that may show 
greater links between it and an adjoining state or unit). 
 146. See, e.g., Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 45 (Oct. 16) (explor-
ing the veracity of this claim and the distinction between a religious versus temporal 
claim that lies at the heart of the dispute). The precursor to the modern state of Morocco, 
the Sherifian State, was an expansive non-territorially based state that laid claim (at least 
in terms of religious Shari’a law) to much of the Maghreb. See Joshua Castellino, Na-
tional Identity & the International Law of Self-Determination: The Stratification of the 
Western Saharan “Self,” in ACCOMMODATING NATIONAL IDENTITY: NEW APPROACHES IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 257, 270–81 (Stephen Tierney ed., 2000). In any 
case, under the modern norm of the human right to self-determination, it would seem that 
the residents of the territory have the right to determine their political future. The difficul-
ty inevitably lies in understanding who the eligible constituents are. 
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attached to the critical date; if the critical date could be challenged, there 
would be disagreements as to the importance of particular events, dates, 
and ultimately the fate of the territory.147 Permitting such challenges runs 
the risk of opening up a continuously available process, which could act 
as an incentive to legitimize the use of force and subsequent occupation. 
Thus, the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, in conjunction with a restricted 
determination of a critical date, has ultimately yielded a process that is 
believed by international jurists to support the necessary preconditions 
for order.148
The salient effect of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris is best captured 
in the ICJ’s opinion in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali): 
 
[T]he essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect 
for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is 
achieved. Such territorial boundaries may be no more than delimita-
tions between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject 
to the same sovereign. In that case, the application of the principle of 
uti possidetis resulted in administrative boundaries being transformed 
into international frontiers in the full sense of the term.149
The single point in time at which this boundary was framed assumed 
grave importance, since no subsequent change would be recognized un-
less it had the consent of the incumbent powers.
 
150 Nevertheless, all 
boundaries are constructed, and are in some sense artificial.151 Conse-
quently, one approach to resolving the legitimacy of territorial bounda-
ries would be to examine the manner in which some of these critical 
dates were decided, and to test their validity vis-à-vis, for example, the 
patently unequal acquisitory treaties between the colonizer and the indi-
genous community.152
                                                                                                         
 147. See, e.g., Kathleen Cavanaugh, Rewriting Law: The Case of Israel and the Occu-
pied Territories, in NEW LAWS, NEW WARS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST 
CENTURY CONFLICTS 227 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005) (explain-
ing that the discussion around conflict can in and of itself become the biggest obstacle for 
its resolution). 
 However, any attempt to redress and question 
these notions comes up against the intertemporal rule of law. 
 148. See infra Part IV. See generally BODMER, supra note 103 (regarding the Spanish 
conquest in the Americas); PICÓN-SALAS, supra note 106, at 27–42. 
 149. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1996 I.C.J. 554, 566 (Dec. 22). 
 150. Ratner, supra note 22, at 608. 
 151. S. WHITTEMORE BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: A STUDY OF BOUNDARY 
FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEMS 74–93 (1940) (discussing South American boundaries). See 
also Reeves, supra note 42, at 541–45. 
 152. See Alexandrowicz, The Role of Treaties in the European-African Confrontation 
in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 39. 
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Thus, the doctrinal tools governing title to territory—terra nullius and 
uti possidetis juris—on their face have significant merit. The justification 
for uti possidetis juris, for instance, is easy to see, especially in the con-
text of the return to peace after cessation of hostilities and in the impor-
tance it gives to the consent of the disputing parties to a settlement that 
deviates from the status quo. While there is little doubt that such consent 
involves difficult negotiations, it is certainly preferable that such negotia-
tions do take place, rather than resolutions through force. Crucially, in 
the context of indigenous peoples’ land rights, had the doctrine of uti 
possidetis juris functioned effectively from the start, indigenous land 
rights would have been adequately protected. The granting of de facto 
possessory rights to existing territory holders would have precluded an-
nexation by colonial powers and would have seen legitimacy properly 
ascribed to existing populations, in denial of terra nullius. 
B. The Principle of Terra Nullius: A Shield Against Inter-Continental 
Territorial Rivalry 
As discussed above, the principle of terra nullius was an important 
principle in jus gentium and was an important part of international law. 
In the discussion among jurists about the manner in which territory could 
be acquired, there was a general consensus that only terra nullius, or un-
inhabited territory, could be subject to acquisition.153
The principle that only territory considered terra nullius could be oc-
cupied failed to protect the lands of indigenous and tribal peoples from 
colonial occupation. In many circumstances, this territory was acquired 
through subsequent cession—using unequal and even fraudulent trea-
ties—subjugation, and, in some instances, quasi-prescription claims.
 As was seen in the 
articulation of the law governing occupation, the principle of terra nul-
lius expanded from a doctrine denoting blank, unoccupied territory based 
on the objective existence or inexistence of inhabitants upon a territory, 
to a subjective analysis of the social quality of habitation that determined 
whether or not a territory was considered terra nullius. 
154
                                                                                                         
 153. See ANDREW BORKOWSKI & PAUL DU PLESSIS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 182–83 
(3d ed. 2005). 
 
Arguably, all of this was animated by a racist belief that some kinds of 
 154. See U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Indi-
genous Peoples & Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationships to the Land, ¶ 
21–32, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21 (June 11, 2001) (prepared by Erica-Irene A. 
Daes). 
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possession merited title-generating rights while others did not.155
Terra nullius did not figure as predominantly in jurists’ discussions of 
other acquisitions of colonial property outside the Creole context.
 Indeed, 
this was plausibly the central feature underpinning the categorization of 
indigenous territory as terra nullius: while peoples may have existed on 
the land, the relationship they exercised towards it was insufficient to 
suggest individual ownership, i.e., title-generating activity. 
156 
Elsewhere, there was an assumption that the spread of Christianity, 
commerce, and civilization could only benefit the peoples coming under 
European subjugation.157 This is especially surprising since the Creole 
resuscitation of the principle of terra nullius was achieved prior to the 
second wave colonization of African and Asian territories.158 The Creole 
invocation of the doctrine of terra nullius was largely in response to the 
fear among the new incumbent sovereigns that parts of their newly ac-
quired territory were not effectively occupied, and could fall prey to re-
conquista.159
If the doctrine of uti possidetis juris acted as a sword against territorial 
claims from within the continent by other new sovereigns,
 
160
                                                                                                         
 155. See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19–34 (2004) 
(discussing the historical backdrop of indigenous peoples’ role in international society 
and positivism in international law). 
 a separate 
shield was necessary to put in place a regime that would forestall any 
external threat to the states in the New World. The principle of terra nul-
 156. See generally CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ, THE EUROPEAN-AFRICAN 
CONFRONTATION 12 (1973) (highlighting the European-African confrontation); ERIC 
AXELSON, PORTUGAL AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 1875–1891 (1967) (emphasizing 
the Portuguese role in colonization of Africa); J.C. ANENE, SOUTHERN NIGERIA IN 
TRANSITION (1966) (revealing the extent to which the boundaries cut across pre-existing 
communities); J.C. ANENE, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF NIGERIA 1885–1960 
(1970); S.E. CROWE, BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE 1884–1885 (Negro Univ. Press 
1970) (1942) (for an insight into the proceedings and discussions on territory and identi-
ty); A.O. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1967); PARTITIONED AFRICANS: ETHNIC RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 1884–1984, supra note 40 (illustrating the impact of the colonial boundaries 
on African national identities); Simeon E. Baldwin, The International Congresses and 
Conferences of the Last Century as Forces Working Toward the Solidarity of the World, 
1 AM. J. INT’L L. 565 (1907); Victoria Brittain, Colonialism and the Predatory State in 
the Congo, 236 NEW LEFT REV. 133 (1999) (highlighting the nature of the state). 
 157. See BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN’S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE 
NATION-STATE 11–12, 25–38 (1992). 
 158. See generally RUPERT EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF 
ASSERTION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES (4th ed. 1967). 
 159. See Alvarez, supra note 107, at 277–78. 
 160. See supra Part III.A. 
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lius became a reliable ally in this quest.161 While not new to modern pub-
lic international law, the principle had fallen into relative abeyance as 
colonial powers determined the geographic extent to which they wished 
their political sphere of influence to spread.162 Elsewhere, new sove-
reigns simply took action to achieve this, without recourse to the prin-
ciple of terra nullius.163 While many occupations were achieved ostensi-
bly through treaties of cession,164 the fraudulent manner of their agree-
ment and subsequent “validation” was unlikely to pass muster if chal-
lenged in domestic courts.165 Fortunately for the imperial powers, most 
domestic courts of colonial powers simply did not exercise jurisdiction 
over activities that occurred in other parts of the realm, and consequent-
ly, concerted legal challenges did not really materialize.166 In this way, 
law became subservient to the political interests of colonial powers, and 
fueled the intense competition for territories without regard for indigen-
ous peoples.167
This expanded interpretation of terra nullius assisted colonial expan-
sion, and brought within its scope vast swathes of inhabited territory.
 
168 
In one sense, it was ostensibly the “failure” of incumbents to organize 
themselves into recognizable political units to the imperial powers’ satis-
faction that justified the occupation and acquisition of territories. This 
creative interpretation fueled competition among the imperial powers and 
led to a distasteful episode of history referred to euphemistically as the 
“Scramble for Africa,”169
                                                                                                         
 161. See Jörg Fisch, Africa as Terra Nullius: The Berlin Conference and International 
Law, in BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA 347 (Sig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & 
Ronald Robinson eds., 1988). 
 which was instigated by King Leopold of Bel-
 162. See CROWE, supra note 156, at 11–91. 
 163. See generally id. 
 164. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE, supra note 74, at 679–86. 
 165. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, TREATIES AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (1992). 
 166. See generally LAND RIGHTS, ETHNO-NATIONALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HISTORY 
(Stanley L. Engerman & Jacob Metzer eds., 2004). 
 167. See Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Jus-
tice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779 (2004) (highlighting the considerations that the ICJ took into 
account while revealing the extent to which the issue of indigenous peoples—more spe-
cifically the identity of the peoples—was not a significant factor). Of the eight factors 
isolated, only one—culture—could be said to be directly attributable to group identity. 
See id. 
 168. See KORMAN, supra note 54, at 1–93. 
 169. See generally AXELSON, supra note 156; THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: 
DOCUMENTS ON THE BERLIN WEST AFRICAN CONFERENCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 
1884/1885, supra note 95; THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (1991). 
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gium’s quest for personal property170 in the heart of Africa.171 In the 
process, territories inhabited by non-European peoples became vulnera-
ble in law to occupation and annexation.172
The process just described was slightly different in Latin American 
states, however, since the Creole interpretation of terra nullius declared 
that all American territory was considered occupied territory, and the 
incumbent sovereigns exercised effective control over the lands and pop-
ulations of the continent, north and south.
 
173 This declaration concerning 
American territory made important points that effectively undermined 
the international perception of terra nullius.174
First, the announcement implied effective control of all territory within 
the continent, even though there were vast swathes of territory inhabited 
by peoples unaware of any change in sovereignty.
 
175 These “non-
contact” populations were never asked for their consent, were never sub-
jugated, and certainly did not bear any allegiance to the newly proc-
laimed sovereigns exercising power in their name.176 The new sovereigns 
claimed to be the sovereign occupiers of territories without effectively 
demonstrating the two essential elements—namely, possession and ad-
ministration—that would cement the occupation, and thereby, title.177
Second, the Creole declaration of independence, while based on no-
tions of individual liberty and ideals from the Enlightenment,
 
178
                                                                                                         
 170. See Mumbanza Mwa Bawele, Afro-European Relations in the Western Congo 
Basin c. 1884–1885, in BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND AFRICA 469 (Sig Förster, Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds., 1988). 
 never-
 171. This is captured in the classical literary text, JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF 
DARKNESS (Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1902). 
 172. See MARC FERRO, COLONIZATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY 104–62, 186–210 (1997) 
(illustrating the vulnerability of non-European society to European colonization and dis-
cussing the “vision of the vanquished”). See also WILLIAM B. COHEN, THE FRENCH 
ENCOUNTER WITH AFRICANS: WHITE RESPONSE TO BLACKS, 1530–1880 (1980) (address-
ing the particular issues that arose in the context of French colonization); ROBERT J. 
MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & 
CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2006) (discussing the vulnerability of Native American 
property in the United States). 
 173. See Manger, supra note 127. 
 174. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 57–89 (alluding to the post facto impact of the 
declaration); Alvarez, supra note 107, at 311. 
 175. See Moore & Lemos, supra note 93; Rodrigues, supra note 93. 
 176. See supra note 175. See generally Charles E. Hughes, Observations on the Mo-
nroe Doctrine, 17 AM. J. INT’L L. 611 (1923). 
 177. For a similar discussion vis-à-vis African states, see R.H. Jackson in note 93. 
 178. See PICÓN-SALAS, supra note 106 (capturing the inspiration that motivated the 
Creole action). It is interesting to note that the failure to consult indigenous peoples was 
not seen as particularly relevant in historic works. See DANA G. MUNRO, THE FIVE 
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theless applied these values selectively, excluding indigenous peoples 
who were the original possessors of the territories and African-American 
populations who were moved to the territories as chattel during the slave 
trade.179 In contrast to the Creole action, the decolonization of Africa a 
century and a half later resulted in new states that were formed with se-
cure boundaries drawn by the previous administration’s domestic 
laws,180 which emphasized state building and internal consolidation of 
existing territory.181 The prime rationale for this was the maintenance of 
order within the continent.182 Although states in South America contin-
ued to nurse territorial grievances against each other,183 the grievances 
were premised on disagreements concerning boundary demarcations, 
unlike the more substantive disagreements typically contested in boun-
dary disputes in contemporary Africa.184
The general impact of the principle of terra nullius has already been 
discussed in various legal fora.
 
185 Like the doctrine of uti possidetis juris, 
the principle of terra nullius was originally not only unproblematic, but 
also contained more than a modicum of respect for existing popula-
tions.186
                                                                                                         
REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL AMERICA: THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND 
THEIR RELATION WITH THE UNITED STATES (David Kinley ed., 1918) (providing a succinct 
analysis of the background to the emergence of the Five Republics but not discussing the 
issue of consulting indigenous peoples in their formation). 
 If a territory was unoccupied, it was conceivably open to claims. 
 179. See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC 
SLAVE TRADE 1440–1870 (1997). 
 180. See generally MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA: FROM THE HOPES OF 
FREEDOM TO THE HEART OF DESPAIR (2005) (providing a poignant analysis of each Afri-
can state’s transition of colonialism). 
 181. See Rupert Emerson, Nation-Building in Africa, in NATION BUILDING 95 (Karl W. 
Deutsch & William J. Foltz eds., 1963). 
 182. See generally supra note 141 (defining order). 
 183. See cases cited supra note 128. See generally COMMENTARIES ON WORLD COURT 
DECISIONS (1987–1996) (Peter H.F. Bekker ed., 1998). 
 184. See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13) 
(discussing issues concerning the types of occupation and title-generating rights, rather 
than purely adjudicating on a boundary dispute, in the African context); Territorial Dis-
pute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (discussing issues concerning the types of oc-
cupation and title-generating rights, rather than purely adjudicating a boundary dispute, in 
the African context); Edward Douglas White, In the Matter of the Arbitration of the 
Boundary Dispute Between the Republics of Costa Rica & Panama Provided for by the 
Convention Between Costa Rica and Panama of March 17, 1910, 8 AM. J. INT’L L. 913 
(1914) (explaining the boundary controversy between Costa Rica and Panama). It could 
also be argued that the Advisory Opinion in the Western Sahara Case was also classically 
in this vein. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 83–102 (Oct. 16). 
 185. See, e.g., supra note 85. 
 186. See Moore, supra note 28, at 328–30. 
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Claims to such territory could be established through a process of con-
tinued occupation, akin to adverse possession,187 while in other systems, 
claims could be lodged through a process of formal accession of title 
deeds.188 In either situation, accession of property that was bereft of 
owners was understood as legitimate, in keeping with the large-scale mi-
gration of peoples that are significant to human history.189
The corruption of the principle of terra nullius lies in its interpretation, 
which was already discernible in its original manifestation in jus civile. 
As captured effectively by Judge Ammoun in his dissenting opinion in 
the Western Sahara Case, the doctrine of terra nullius was first inter-
preted to render all non-Roman territory terra nullius, thus implying that 
only Roman law could create legitimacy and title bearing rights.
 
190 This 
was modified in the nineteenth century, when tribes considered uncivi-
lized were not recognized, and as such, the land on which they subsisted 
was considered terra nullius despite their presence.191 The paradigmatic 
example of this phenomenon is the imperial powers’ naked aggression in 
their quest for territory in Africa, and their treatment of indigenous 
peoples’ territory.192 The ramifications of this aggression are central to 
an effective settlement that would protect the rights of indigenous 
peoples while also ensuring the competing rights of non-indigenous 
peoples.193
                                                                                                         
 187. See Ballantine, supra note 140. See also JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL 
HISTORY (1913) (manifesting the doctrine of adverse possession in English municipal 
law); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 29–80 (2d ed. 1898) (discussing the history of seisin). 
 
 188. See generally LAND LAW: ISSUES, DEBATES, POLICY (Louise Tee ed., 2002). 
 189. See generally PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW (Terry Lee 
Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003). 
 190. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 83–87 (Oct. 16) (separate 
opinion of Judge Ammoun). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See J.D. Hargreaves, The Making of the Boundaries: Focus on West Africa, in 
PARTITIONED AFRICANS: ETHNIC RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 1884–1984, at 19 (A.I. Asiwaju ed., 1985) (providing a rich analysis of the 
extent to which boundary regimes were constructed without the consent of the indigenous 
people who were already the occupants of the territory). See generally 1 COLONIALISM IN 
AFRICA 1870–1960 (L.H. Gann & Peter Duignan eds., 1969) (discussing the principles 
and actions during the period in question); John Flint, Chartered Companies and the 
Transition from Informal Sway to Colonial Rule in Africa, in BISMARCK, EUROPE, AND 
AFRICA 69 (Sig Förster, Wolfgang J. Mommsen & Ronald Robinson eds., 1988) (pointing 
to the commercial aspect under which such appropriation occurred). 
 193. See S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human 
Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (2001). 
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IV. CHALLENGES WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ICJ JURISPRUDENCE 
Having traced the manner in which the doctrines have evolved through 
history, it is appropriate to highlight the extent to which the ICJ has con-
tributed to a further clarification of the concepts. This Part reflects on the 
key cases that have been addressed by the court and the specific nuances 
of these broad doctrines. Specifically, this Part comments on the manner 
in which the court has resolved four key issues: (1) the issue of locus 
standi in terms of territorial disputes; (2) the importance of documenting 
a territorial claim—specifically, a comment on the value of maps in this 
process; (3) an examination of the kinds of actions that indicate title-
generating activity; and (4) the importance of the critical date in deter-
mining the fate of a given territory. This Part concludes with an overview 
of how some of these issues are raised in currently pending ICJ cases. 
The modern international legal position on terra nullius is epitomized 
by the judgment in the Western Sahara Case.194
I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Saket El Hamra) at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)? If 
the answer to the first question is in the negative, 
 Two questions were ad-
dressed to the ICJ: 
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of 
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?195
With reference to the first question, the court determined that the West-
ern Sahara was not terra nullius before the Spanish arrival on the 
grounds that, “at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited 
by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in 
tribes and chiefs competent to represent them.”
 
196 This determination 
would seem to favor the indigenous Saharan tribes in the territory; how-
ever, the court ruled—with reference to the second question—that a link 
existed between these tribes and the Sherifian State, the precursor to 
modern Morocco.197
                                                                                                         
 194. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. 
 King Hassan ultimately used the court’s determina-
tion to justify Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara based on the 
 195. Id. at 14. 
 196. Id. at 39. 
 197. Id. at 40. See CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL “NATIONAL” IDENTITY, supra note 15, at 233–52 (discussing the merits of the 
Western Sahara Case). See also Malcolm Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 44 BRIT. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 118 (1978); Thomas M. Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 694 (1978). 
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court’s latter conclusion vis-à-vis ties between the Western Sahara and 
the predecessor state to Morocco.198
In the face of imperial powers seeking to nullify indigenous peoples’ 
inherent rights to territory, indigenous peoples and minorities with terri-
torial claims face insurmountable limitations in accessing the ICJ, includ-
ing the fact that the court can only be accessed by state parties.
 
199 While 
the cases before the ICJ have been of an interstate nature, several of them 
nevertheless discuss the issues of uti possidetis juris and terra nullius in 
great detail.200 In this sense, the Western Sahara Case stands out, since it 
concerned the future of territory that was not in the full possession of 
either of the two claimants.201 This exception is explained on the grounds 
that King Hassan of Morocco sought justification for the planned Green 
March into the territory.202 International courts and tribunals have faced 
other cases that inevitably involve a competition for territory that is oc-
cupied de facto—though perhaps not de jure—by one sovereign state.203
In this framework, in theory the incumbent within a territory would 
continue to hold title, with the opponent’s claim effectively dismissed ab 
initio.
 
204
                                                                                                         
 198. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 68 (Oct. 16). 
 Nevertheless, courts delve into the question of the de jure title to 
 199. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 (“Only states may be parties in cases before the Court.”). 
 200. See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion of 
Judge Ajibola); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. inter-
vening), 1992 IC.J. 351 (Sept. 11); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 
(Dec. 22); India v. Pak. (Rann of Kutch), 50 I.L.R. 2 (Indo-Pak. Western Boundary Case 
Trib. 1968); Dubai v. Sharjah (Ct. Arb. 1981) (dissenting opinion of Judge Bebler). See 
also CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 119–55 (reviewing eight ICJ cases concerning territoriality); 
CUKWURAH, supra note 156, at 190–99 (identifying cases concerning uti possidetis). 
 201. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. See also Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 
supra note 197, at 135–39. The two claimants at the time were Morocco and Mauritania. 
See id. Spain had accepted its need to decolonize, but the nomadic Saharawis were not 
represented in proceedings. See id. 
 202. See generally TONY HODGES, WESTERN SAHARA: THE ROOTS OF A DESERT WAR 
210–11 (1983) (outlining the political factors that underlay the reference of this case for 
the Court’s advisory opinion). 
 203. Such disputes arise in connection with the physical occupation of a particular 
territory without the establishment or determination of legal title. See, e.g., D.J. HARRIS, 
CASES AND MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 109–10 (5th ed. 1998) (1973) (the situa-
tion concerning Manchukuo). 
 204. See Ratner, supra note 22, at 607–16 (discussing the doctrine’s practical short-
comings). 
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territory.205 However, the courts inevitably focus on a historical date 
when de facto occupation is deemed to have legitimized continuing terri-
torial claims. Notwithstanding decisions taken by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (“PCIJ”)—the ICJ’s predecessor—and other tribun-
als, the first such dispute before the ICJ was Sovereignty over Certain 
Frontier Land (Belgium v. Netherlands) Case in 1959.206 In this case, the 
ICJ focused its attention on the findings of the Mixed Boundary Com-
mission, which sought to preserve the territorial status quo.207 Taking its 
lead from these findings, the ICJ set out on the premise that Belgium had 
sovereignty over the territory as the de facto possessor.208 Therefore, the 
court examined whether there had been any subsequent extinguishments 
of these rights, which could have given rise to an effective Dutch titular 
claim.209
In this context, although the concept of “title” to territory is regularly 
used in international legal cases,
 
210 it is difficult to find an adequate legal 
definition for this term. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali) pro-
vides the best elaboration, where rather than a definition of title, the ICJ 
identified the sources of title as not restricted to documentary evidence 
alone: “[T]he concept of title may also, and more generally, comprehend 
both any evidence which may establish the existence of a right, and the 
actual source of that right.”211
However, in the context of the right to self-determination, which may 
include a territorial claim, this explanation remains inadequate. Attribut-
ing a specific value to the relationship between a community and territo-
ry is difficult. The task of adjudicating between competing claims is next 
to impossible without engaging prejudices about the value of such a de-
termination, which impacts the result of the judgment. In addition, from 
the perspective of modern claims to territory, the following salient issues 
have emerged from the ICJ jurisprudence concerning ownership and pos-
session of contested territory. 
 
                                                                                                         
 205. See Sumner, supra note 167. Several of the eight factors identified by Sumner in 
his brief note could be considered relevant to the de jure determination of a contested 
territory. See id. 
 206. Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209 (June 
20). 
 207. See id. at 214. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. at 222. 
 210. See Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3), reviewed by 
COMMENTARIES ON WORLD COURT DECISIONS (1987–1996), supra note 183, at 173–82. 
 211. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 564 (Dec. 22). 
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A. Claimants to Title to Territory: Locus Standi 
Although the ICJ can only examine interstate claims, it has addressed 
wider questions through its advisory jurisdiction. Cases concerning title 
to territory that arose in this context include the Western Sahara Case,212 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory,213 and the early cases concerning Namibia—Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276 (1970)214 and International Status of South West Africa.215 
While actions in Namibia and Palestine were mobilized in light of in-
tense public scrutiny of the incumbent states,216 the dispute in the West-
ern Sahara Case arose at the colonial ruler’s departure.217
In effect, there is little possibility that a case would be raised in the 
names of indigenous peoples or other non-state claimants to territory. 
Despite progress that has solidified the role of the individual in interna-
tional law, interstate dispute mechanisms such as the ICJ are unable to 
address claims that are not brought by state parties. Although some states 
may be willing to sponsor certain territorial claims,
 
218
                                                                                                         
 212. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). 
 the nature of the 
 213. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9). For authoritative commentary on 
this case, see id. at 211 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) and David Kretzmer, The 
Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, 99 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 88 (2005). 
 214. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). See also John Dugard, Namibia (South West Africa): 
The Court’s Opinion, South Africa’s Response, and Prospects for the Future, 11 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14 (1972). 
 215. International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 270 
(Dec. 30). 
 216. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestini-
an Territory, 2004 I.C.J. at 211 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); Legal Consequences 
for the States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J. at 17–22; International 
Status of South-West Africa, 1949 I.C.J. 270. See also Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: 
The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law, supra note 213 (discussing the 
Palestinian action); Dugard, supra note 214. 
 217. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. 
 218. See, e.g., MEREDITH, supra note 180, at 71–74 (discussing Algeria’s reputation in 
the 1960s as a state that favored movements for self-determination by providing moral 
and physical support for them). In today’s terminology, any such overt or covert support 
might be described as support for terrorism. Despite the merits of a particular argument, it 
seems difficult to imagine any legal challenges before the ICJ being brought under this 
guise. 
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process and the determination of admissibility operate to prevent many 
potential claims. Thus, peoples that claim self-determination including 
title to territory have no option but to seek relief from state structures. In 
this context, the lesser offer of territorial autonomy is often considered a 
viable option.219 However, it fails to address the issue of the claimant’s 
title to territory,220 and instead offers a negotiated political settlement to 
the governance of the territory.221 Two territorial claims in recent 
years222 that are notable for their success were nevertheless achieved 
through international political processes rather than law, involved much 
bloodshed, and eventually resulted in a U.N.-supported plebiscite.223
                                                                                                         
 219. See Geoff Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International 
Law?, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307 (2002); HANNUM, supra note 11; Jane Wright, Minori-
ty Groups, Autonomy, and Self-Determination, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 
(1999) (“[A]utonomy should be regarded as a constructive tool by which the property 
aspirations of minority groups may be realized.”). 
 In 
terms of indigenous peoples and other potential claimants of title to terri-
tory, the limited option of the human rights mechanism, addressed be-
low, forms a watered-down and difficult option through which to judi-
cially engage this question at the international level. 
 220. The status of self-determination as a right in modern international law is highly 
dependent on the respective state’s political perspective. In applying self-determination to 
federal states, there is even less information available than in the international domain. 
The definitive case on the subject is the secession of Québec that came before the Cana-
dian Supreme Court. Reference re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. Neverthe-
less, the court expressed concern about the safeguards necessary to protect the rights of 
indigenous Canadians within Québec. See id. at 261–63 (addressing protection of minori-
ties). 
 221. See generally ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 248–62 (2004). 
 222. See generally EYASSU GAYIM, THE ERITREAN QUESTION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE INTERESTS OF STATES (1993) (explaining the 
history of the struggle in Eritrea); IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: 
THE UN, THE BALLOT, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2001) (explaining the history 
of the struggle in Timor-Leste). 
  It could also be argued that the emergence of the state of Bangladesh was a victo-
ry for the use of superior force. See Joshua Castellino, The Secession of Bangladesh: 
Setting New Standards in International Law?, 7 ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 83 (2000). See also 
Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities—
Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 321 (1972) 
(detailing the achievement of Bangladesh’s statehood). 
 223. See S.C. Res. 1246, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1246 (June 11, 1999) (establishing “the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organize and conduct a popular 
consultation”). See generally The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Question of East Timor, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, A/53/951 (May 5, 1999). 
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B. Documenting a Territorial Claim: The Value of Maps 
The ICJ has always been reluctant to accept the strength of maps as 
evidence of territorial claims. In Territorial & Maritime Dispute between 
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea,224 the ICJ referred to 
two prior cases: Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (United States v. Nether-
lands)225 and Arbitral Award of the Special Boundary Panel Determining 
the Frontier between Guatemala and Honduras.226 In the former, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration stressed that “[a]ny maps which do not 
precisely indicate the political distribution of territories . . . clearly 
marked as such, must be rejected forthwith . . . .”227 In the latter case, the 
PCIJ found that maps presented by the parties provided only “slight val-
ue,” since they did not show the extent to which administrative control 
was actually exercised.228
More recently, the ICJ addressed the issue of the value of maps in 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali)
 
229 and Territorial & Maritime 
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.230
[E]ssentially serv[ing] the purpose of buttressing their respective claims 
and of confirming their arguments. The Court finds that it can derive 
little of legal significance from the official maps submitted and the 
maps of geographical institutions cited; these maps will be treated with 
a certain reserve.
 In 
the latter, the presentation of maps was merely seen as: 
231
                                                                                                         
 224. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
bean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), paras. 134, 214 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 
 225. Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. 
Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 226. Honduras Borders (Guat v. Hond.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1309, 1322 (Special 
Boundary Tribunal constituted by the Treaty of Arbitration between Guatemala and Hon-
duras 1933). 
 227. Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards at 852. 
 228. Honduras Borders, 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards at 1325 (“[A]uthenticated maps[] are 
also to be considered, although such descriptive material is of slight value when it relates 
to territory of which little or nothing was known and in which it does not appear that any 
administrative control was actually exercised.”) 
 229. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582 (Dec. 22). Maps 
were considered in of themselves indeterminate in constituting territorial title, or “docu-
ment[s] endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the purpose of estab-
lishing territorial rights.” Id. 
 230. Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
bean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.) (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/ 
files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 231. Id. para. 217. 
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In that case, the sovereignty over the disputed islands was extended to 
Honduras based on post-colonial effectivités,232 not based on submitted 
maps.233
Instead, the ICJ has looked to other types of documentary evidence in 
determining territorial claims, including memos and letters that seek to 
demonstrate external respect for a territorial claim.
 Although parties to territorial disputes seek to demonstrate their 
ownership of territory through maps, the maps have rarely been given 
much credence in the rulings. 
234 The fact that the 
ICJ has engaged such documentary evidence suggests an intrinsic belief 
that externally recognized boundaries are valid constructs, even if they 
were not negotiated based on internal identities. The ICJ, as an upholder 
of international order, can do little more than ensure that the territorial 
limits of state sovereignty continue as defined within the state’s frontiers 
at a given time. The ICJ’s reliance on documentary evidence also sug-
gests that the legal validity of a title to territory can be gauged against 
objective criteria. However, in the context of colonization, this remains a 
particularly problematic test since it inevitably validates both unequal 
treaties between colonial powers and the colonized235 and treaties be-
tween colonial powers that have agreed to the division of territory 
through “spheres of influence” politics.236 The test presupposes the ques-
tion considered (whether the state exercised effective administrative con-
trol over the claimed territory) because it gives credence to memos and 
correspondence written in a specific context and that recognize the legal 
status of the territory’s inhabitants.237
                                                                                                         
 232. Post-colonial effectivités refers to the efficacy or effectiveness of the extent to 
which the post-colonial state has performed its function as a state in relation to a given 
territory. See Bruno Simma & Daniel Erasmus-Khan, Peaceful Settlement of Boundary 
Disputes Under the Auspices of the Organisation of African Unity and the United Na-
tions: The Case of the Frontier Dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia, in 2 LIBER 
AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 1179, 1191 n.39 (Nisuke Ando, Edward McWhinney & 
Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2002). 
 This is especially problematic 
 233. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), para. 227 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 234. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 49 (Oct. 16) (demonstrat-
ing external recognition of sovereignty through treaties, diplomatic correspondence, and 
letters). 
 235. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 165. 
 236. See CROWE, supra note 156. 
 237. See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13). 
The ICJ was forced to examine the veracity of documents offered as interpretative evi-
dence regarding the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, which had established the respective 
spheres of influence of the two superpowers. See id. at 1049–50. The documents ex-
amined included: (1) a 1912 report on a reconnaissance of the Chobe River, produced by 
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when the countervailing evidence derives from a matrix of different cul-
tures and traditions, many of which were often misrepresented in cultural 
anthologies.238 Inevitably, the ICJ requires the submission of evidence 
before it can adjudicate a claim, and equally inevitably, the ICJ must 
make a judgment call upon the value of the evidence presented.239
C. Acts that Establish a Territorial Claim 
 As a 
result, the ICJ is forced to give weight to documentary evidence that may 
be considered suspect under other circumstances. 
A considerable portion of the pleadings in cases concerning title to ter-
ritory is committed to establishing that effective control was exercised 
over a particular territory, and that this control treated the claimed territo-
ry as part of a unified whole with the rest of the state’s territory.240 This 
is particularly ironic because post-colonial claimants often insist that the 
territory they inhabit was terra nullius at the time of colonization, a legal 
fiction that is necessary if the succeeding title is to be considered 
sound.241 The ICJ determines the issue, as it did in Territorial & Mari-
time Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, on 
the grounds of the effectiveness of existing rule, be it colonial effectivités 
or post-colonial effectivités.242
When determining the value of presented evidence, the ICJ usually 
looks for a reliable piece of evidence that indicates the establishment of a 
right or practice that is germane to the territorial title.
 
243
                                                                                                         
the Bechunaland Protectorate Police; (2) correspondence and an arrangement between the 
Eastern Caprivi magistrate and a district commissioner in the Bechunaland Protectorate; 
and (3) an agreement between Botswanan and South African authorities for the Joint 
Survey of the Chobe. See id. at 1076–91. 
 Much of the pre-
 238. See David M. Hart, The Tribe in Modern Morocco: Two Case Studies, in ARABS 
AND BERBERS: FROM TRIBE TO NATION IN NORTH AFRICA 425 (Ernest Gellner & Charles 
Antoine Micaud eds., 1973). 
 239. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 150–52. 
 240. See id. at 119–55. 
 241. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). 
 242. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), para. 227 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 243. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. interven-
ing), 1992 IC.J. 351, 363–64 (Sept. 11) (examining documents of the Spanish Crown and 
the 1980 General Peace Treaty between the parties); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Ma-
li), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 568, 582 (Dec. 22) (examining French colonial law and the study of 
maps to determine their validity); Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg. v. 
Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. at 218 (examining the veracity of the work of the Boundary Commis-
sion). See also Castellino, National Identity & the International Law of Self-
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sented evidence is based on complicated historical events that are bitterly 
contested by the parties in the first place.244 The ICJ is often ill-suited to 
make such pronouncements and must instead rely on the quality and 
presentation of the evidence to determine its historical veracity.245 When 
examined closely, much of the parties’ documentary evidence is remark-
ably similar and makes for an equally compelling or problematic basis 
for claiming adequate administration over a disputed territory. The plead-
ings in the Western Sahara Case present a good illustration of this prob-
lem.246 Both Morocco and Mauritania produced evidence to support their 
territorial claim to the Western Sahara.247 Morocco based its claim on its 
succession to the Sherifian State, which allegedly covered Morocco and 
the territory subsequently deemed the Spanish Sahara.248 Mauritania 
based its claim on a complex network of allegiances that could be identi-
fied as part of the Bilad Shinguitti, which was argued to be the precursor 
to modern Mauritania.249 The court ruled on the extent to which any links 
between the territory and the antecedent states gave rise to a sustainable 
territorial claim.250 While the judgment reveals that it is difficult to ascer-
tain the veracity of these claims, King Hassan ultimately read the judg-
ment as supporting Morocco’s territorial claim.251
Similar difficulties arose in both Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. 
Mali) and Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad).
 
252 In Frontier Dispute (Bur-
kina Faso v. Mali), the ICJ identified colonial effectivités as “the conduct 
of the administrative authorities as proof of the effective exercise of terri-
torial jurisdiction in the region during the colonial period.”253
                                                                                                         
Determination: The Stratification of the Western Saharan “Self,” supra note 145, at 135 
(discussing the Court’s examination of a diverse set of documents and practices). 
 By articu-
lating the principle of colonial effectivités, the ICJ established it as a cor-
 244. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 151–52. 
 245. See HODGES, supra note 202, at 210–11. See, e.g., Territorial Dispute 
(Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 16 (Feb. 3); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 
I.C.J. at 620–24. 
 246. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12. 
 247. See id. at 14. 
 248. See id. at 40. 
 249. See id. at 41. 
 250. See id. The ICJ’s ruling would be especially important in the event Mauritania 
dropped its claim, especially with a backdrop of secret negotiations between the parties in 
a bid to dismember the Western Sahara. See JARAT CHOPRA, UNITED NATIONS 
DETERMINATION OF THE WESTERN SAHARAN SELF (1994). See generally JOHN DAMIS, 
CONFLICT IN NORTHWEST AFRICA: THE WESTERN SAHARA DISPUTE (1983). 
 251. See Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, supra note 197, at 713–14. 
 252. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22). 
 253. Id. at 586. 
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nerstone of the doctrine of uti possidetis juris. While colonial effectivités 
fulfills the condition of effective administration over a territory,254 its 
real value is in showing title to territory under colonial law. It limits the 
territorial jurisdiction within which a colonial power exercised sove-
reignty, either in relation to another external competing sovereign or 
another internal administrative sub-division of the territory.255 This terri-
torial limitation consists of the uti possidetis juris line that was sanctified 
as an international boundary when the colonial ruler departed and the 
new ruler inherited the territory through succession. Thus, proof of co-
lonial effectivités can be found when parties to a dispute come to an 
agreement by consent, and international law essentially ossifies the post-
colonial boundaries on an international level.256 The pleadings and judg-
ment in Frontier Dispute (Libya/Chad) undertook a thorough engage-
ment on this issue and its role in determining the uti possidetis juris 
line.257
To prove the extent of colonial rule in Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswa-
na v. Namibia), the state parties relied on a document that ostensibly 
showed evidence of an administrative agreement between the colonial 
authorities in charge of the Caprivi strip—the precursor to modern Na-
mibia—and the colonial authorities in Bechunaland.
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 254. See supra Part II. 
 However, the 
 255. Cf. supra note 232 (regarding post-colonial effectivités). Colonial effectivités de-
monstrates, in a document, that effective control was exercised over a territory claimed to 
be within the jurisdiction of the principal colonial occupier. See also supra text accompa-
nying note 253. 
 256. See CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 153–55. 
 257. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 16 (Feb. 3) (involving a cross-
border dispute over a parcel of territory around Lake Chad, where the court engaged in a 
detailed discussion on the concept of droit d’outre-mer, or French colonial law). 
 258. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1058 (Dec. 13). 
The ICJ seems to have engaged in the rights discourse without necessarily laying down 
the parameters of what it anticipates this to entail. It was equally ambiguous about the 
sources of those rights. The ICJ also emphasized the presence and activities of the Masu-
bian people and their title-generating capacities. See id. at 1045, 1093. 
  Similarly, in the Western Sahara Case, Morocco sought to prove its title to terri-
tory by demonstrating exercise of internal sovereignty. Western Sahara, Advisory Opi-
nion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16). One such issue was the appointment of caids, which was 
advanced as an important factor in proving the role and influence of the Sultan over the 
region. See id. at 44. While not examining the merits of either of these arguments, it is 
suggested that they have their sources in religion, tradition, and culture and their different 
interpretations. However, the task of determining the sources of other rights is difficult 
when not all sources are as established as religion. See, e.g., id. at 83–102 (separate opi-
nion of Judge Ammoun) (illustrating the importance of nomadism and its importance in 
the Western Sahara Case). It is clear that the ICJ is willing to engage arguments with 
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court did not accept the document as evidence of the adequate exercise of 
colonial effectivités over the territory259 and consequently did not accept 
the sovereignty claim.260
Like the doctrine of colonial éffectivites, the doctrine of uti possidetis 
juris essentially applies a retrospective doctrine that is based on a specif-
ic reading of the fate of the territory at a given moment in history. Al-
though Judge Harry Dillard’s separate opinion in the Western Sahara 
Case stated that “[i]t is for the people to determine the destiny of the ter-
ritory”
 
261 and not vice versa, it was in fact the fate of the territory that 
retrospectively determined the fate of the people. The ICJ’s application 
of uti possidetis juris is appropriate to these cases of disputed territory 
because the court has insisted that state consent is the defining standard 
in determining title to the territory.262 In terms of the discussion of con-
temporary claims to self-determination involving a territorial element, 
the extent and exclusivity of colonial effectivités truly is fundamental. 
This was the underlying argument in several cases in which modern post-
colonial entities sought to prove variations on uti possidetis juris lines 
based on lack of colonial administration in border regions.263
Colonial effectivités is open to criticism on a number of grounds, espe-
cially in the context of indigenous rights to territory, where states have 
interpreted the legal doctrine differently. Kingsbury identifies five com-
peting conceptual structures for the perpetuation of indigenous peoples’ 
claims in international and comparative law.
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regard to alternative displays of ownership, which is significant in the context of indigen-
ous peoples’ claims to territory. 
 This discussion is ex-
 259. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. at 1100. 
 260. See id. at 1103–05. See also CASTELLINO & ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 140–48. 
 261. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 122 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard). 
 262. This is not a new theoretical point since it has always been possible to change 
boundaries through the consent of the state parties. See Kaikobad, Some Observations on 
the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries, supra note 22 (discussing bounda-
ries and the manner in which they function); BOGGS, supra note 151 (providing an older 
and more theoretical examination). 
 263. See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (questioning the 
specific title-generating ability of indigenous peoples’ actions). See also CASTELLINO & 
ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEMPORAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
31, at 137–40. 
 264. See Kingsbury, supra note 13. According to Kingsbury, these five claims could be 
classified as: “(1) human rights and non-discrimination claims; (2) minority claims; (3) 
self-determination claims; (4) historic sovereignty claims; and (5) claims as indigenous 
peoples, including claims based on treaties or other agreements between indigenous 
peoples and states.” See id. at 190. But see Will Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, 
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tremely helpful since it reveals the range of arguments regarding the rela-
tionship between a state’s existing legal doctrine and its application to 
the rights of indigenous peoples. Weissner’s detailed study also reveals 
the different approaches that exist in states’ treatment of indigenous 
peoples’ rights.265
D. Critical Date 
 
Without a doubt, the most significant ramification for the future of a 
territory is the snapshot266
[A]cts performed à titre de souverain which are in principle relevant 
for the purpose of assessing and validating effectivités, and those acts 
occurring after such critical date, which are in general meaningless for 
that purpose, having been carried out by a State which, already having 
claims to assert in a legal dispute, could have taken those actions strict-
ly with the aim of buttressing those claims.
 of the territory on the critical date. The signi-
ficance of the critical date in a territorial or maritime delimitation dispute 
lies primarily in distinguishing between: 
267
Therefore, the parties’ acts after the critical date are not relevant in as-
sessing the value of effectivités.
 
268
                                                                                                         
49 U. TORONTO L. J. 281–92 (1999) (illustrating an alternative approach to indigenous 
peoples’ claims). 
 In Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea, the disputants 
contested two legal issues concerning the doctrine of uti possidetis juris: 
 265. See Wiessner, supra note 48 (covering the domestic jurisdictions of a range of 
states, including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil, and others). 
 266. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 658 (Dec. 22). The 
ICJ explained: 
[U]ti possidetis . . . applies to the new State (as a State) not with retroactive ef-
fect, but immediately and from that moment onwards. It applies to the State as 
it is; i.e., to the “photograph” of the territorial situation then existing. The prin-
ciple of uti possidetis freezes the territorial title; it stops the clock, but does not 
put back the hands. 
Id. 
 267. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), para. 117 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 268. See id. See also Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (In-
don./Malay.), 2001 I.C.J. 575, 682 (Oct. 23) (“[The ICJ] cannot take into consideration 
acts having taken place after the date on which the dispute between the Parties crystal-
lized unless such acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not undertaken for 
the purpose of improving the legal position of the Party which relies on them.”). 
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(1) the extent to which the judicially-determined line269 extended to the 
maritime areas and the disputed islands; and (2) the extent to which do-
cumentary evidence established the extent of the local authorities’ con-
trol.270
On the second point, Nicaragua argued that the Spanish authorities in 
Madrid had exclusive jurisdiction over the territorial sea, and therefore 
the sea could not be included in the local authorities’ justifiable claims 
under the doctrine of uti possidetis juris.
 
271 While the ICJ regarded the 
uti possidetis juris line as germane to territorial title and boundary deli-
mitation at the moment of decolonization,272 regardless of whether the 
boundaries were on land or sea,273 the court found it difficult to see how 
uti possidetis juris could be used to determine sovereignty over the isl-
ands.274 In addressing the Nicaraguan claim, the court could only deter-
mine the disputed islands’ status during Spanish colonial rule, and the 
available options were stark.275
It is well established that “a key aspect of the principle [of uti possidetis 
juris] is the denial of the possibility of terra nullius.” However, that dic-
tum cannot bring within the territory of successor States islands not 
shown to be subject to Spanish colonial rule, nor ipso facto render as 
“attributed”, islands which have no connection with the mainland coast 
concerned. Even if both Parties in this case agree that there is no ques-
tion of the islands concerned being res nullius, necessary legal ques-
tions remain to be answered.
 Articulating an important linkage be-
tween terra nullius and uti possidetis juris, the court stated: 
276
                                                                                                         
 269. See Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. 
Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 199–200 (Nov. 18) (quoting an English translation of the 
Gámez-Bonilla Treaty of 1894). Pursuant to article III of the Gámez-Bonilla Treaty, the 
dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua was submitted for arbitration to King Alfonso 
XIII of Spain as sole arbitrator. See id. at 200. After the award was handed down on De-
cember 23, 1906, Nicaragua challenged its validity in 1912. See id. at 203. After con-
certed boundary incidents with the Organization of American States mediating, the par-
ties agreed to submit the dispute to the ICJ in 1957. See id. 
 
 270. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), para. 150 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008). 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. para. 151. 
 273. See id. para. 156. 
 274. See id. para. 158. 
 275. See id. para. 157. 
 276. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.), para. 157 (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/120/14075.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008) (internal citation omitted). 
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In this sense, the court could not see the relevance of the doctrine of uti 
possidetis juris since the principle could not provide a clear answer to the 
question of the sovereignty of the islands.277 Rather, the court found that 
“if the islands are not terra nullius, as both Parties acknowledge and as is 
generally recognized, it must be assumed that they had been under the 
rule of the Spanish Crown.”278
[U]ti possidetis juris presupposes the existence of a delimitation of ter-
ritory between the colonial provinces concerned having been effected 
by the central colonial authorities. Thus in order to apply the principle 
of uti possidetis juris to the islands in dispute it must be shown that the 
Spanish Crown had allocated them to one or the other of its colonial 
provinces.
 Upholding the Nicaraguan query, the 
court ruled: 
279
This ruling echoed the ICJ’s prior judgment in Land, Island and Mari-
time Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 
where the court faced similar difficulty in attributing islands that had not 
been allocated to the contesting territorial administrations. 
 
280
[W]hen the principle of uti possidetis juris is involved, the jus referred 
to is not international law but the constitutional or administrative law of 
the pre-independence sovereign, in this case Spanish colonial law; and 
it is perfectly possible that that law itself gave no clear and definitive 
answers to the appurtenance of marginal areas, or sparsely populated 
areas of minimal economic significance.
 The court 
stressed: 
281
As a result, the uti possidetis juris line has limited value in such circums-
tances, and also raises fundamental questions about the nature of colonial 
effectivités and the extent to which it generated title-claiming activities. 
If colonial effectivités is taken at face value, it consists of “the conduct of 
the administrative authorities as proof of the effective exercise of terri-
torial jurisdiction in the region during the colonial period.”
 
282
Read in this light, questions arise about the extent to which every co-
lonial power has exercised effective administrative control over territory 
deemed to be under colonial rule. It also brings into sharp conflict the 
contiguous territory rule—i.e., where claim to hinterland may be laid 
 
                                                                                                         
 277. See id. para. 158. 
 278. See id. 
 279. See id. 
 280. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 
1992 IC.J. 351, 558–59 (Sept. 11). 
 281. Id. at 559. 
 282. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 586 (Dec. 22). 
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based on effective occupation of the coast, a rule adopted by the Berlin 
West Africa Conference283—and would have significant ramifications 
for indigenous peoples and nations that have been submerged under 
modern states based on tacit or implicit application of uti possidetis juris. 
However, such a reading of the judgment is excessively expansive; it is 
clear that the court had no intention of sanctifying a general rule that 
would bring into question the nature of the control exercised by colonial 
powers, except in the context of an interstate territorial dispute. Although 
there may be no legal significance attached to the fate of former colonial 
territories, it does signify the opening up of the nature of control exer-
cised during colonial times in an international legal forum, about which 
earlier cases were reticent.284 Indeed it could be argued that the engage-
ment of this discussion is tribute to the point raised in Territorial Dispute 
(Libya/Chad) regarding colonial effectivités and the extent to which it 
propelled title-generating claims to territory.285
                                                                                                         
 283. See C.H. Alexandrowicz, The Role of Treaties in the European-African Confron-
tation in the Nineteenth Century, supra note 39, at 46–47. See generally SYBIL E. CROWE, 
THE BERLIN WEST AFRICA CONFERENCE 1884–1885 (1942). The Berlin West Africa Con-
ference (1884–85) consisted of a series of negotiations that took place in Berlin, Germany 
under the chairmanship of Chancellor Otto van Bismarck. See id. at 5–6. The purpose of 
the conference was to create a forum through which the major European powers could 
engage in discussions and determinations concerning their future roles in Africa. See id. 
It is historically famous for the decision to divide Africa into spheres of control. See id. at 
190. 
 
 284. The court is still likely to read the intertemporal rule in its strictest light, but it has 
arguably begun to weigh different factors and examine a wider range of evidence than 
previously considered. See Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, The Quality of Justice: “Excès de 
Pouvoir” in the Adjudication and Arbitration of Territorial and Boundary Disputes, in 
THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 293 (Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999). 
 285. In Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), the Libyans strongly rebutted the effectivités 
argument with respect to treaties: 
[T]he historical evidence shows that when the Anglo-French agreements from 
1890 to 1899 were concluded neither France nor Great Britain had any effec-
tive authority over the African territories and peoples included in their respec-
tive “spheres of influence” and, indeed, no meaningful presence at all in most 
of the region. When France created the “circonscription spéciale dite ‘territoire 
militaire des pays et protectorates du Tchad’” in September 1990, within what 
were then called the French Congo Territories, it had neither effective authority 
nor any real presence in the areas surrounding or extending north of Bir Alali in 
Kanem or in the regions of Borkou, Tibesti, Ouinianga, Erdi and Ennedi. 
Memorial Submitted by the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Vol.1, Ter-
ritorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1991 I.C.J. Pleadings 71, para. 4.06 (Aug. 26, 1991). 
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E. Pending Cases 
The doctrine of uti possidetis juris is likely to be called into question in 
several pending cases.286 For instance, in Territorial & Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Nicaragua has already sought to convince the 
ICJ of its sovereignty over the San Andrés Archipelago based on ancient 
titles generated by the doctrine of uti possidetis juris.287 Although many 
of the pending cases raise issues similar to those previously addressed by 
the ICJ, the PCIJ, and related special tribunals, each disputed territorial 
claim or boundary delimitation request inevitably raises specific ele-
ments that challenge the ICJ to be an authority on history, and to reflect 
this authority in legal judgment.288
To understand who at the time had the authority to determine or change 
a frontier required reliance on national law. But then, as in other such 
cases, it was important for the Court to be able to identify which autho-
rised colonial acts were purely intra-colonial or whether they could 
have the effect of altering a frontier for purposes of international 
law.
 This challenge is identified by Judge 
Higgins, who discussed Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) in a special ad-
dress to the International Law Commission: 
289
In that case, the ICJ was specifically instructed to use the principle of uti 
possidetis juris in its decision: 
 
                                                                                                         
 286. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.) (Dec. 13, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/14305.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008); Pulp 
Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (May 4, 
2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/10779.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 
2008) (concerning the extent to which the Government of Uruguay may decide to locate a 
pulp mill on the common boundary between the states without due consultation); Dispute 
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights of Costa Rica on the San Juan River (Costa 
Rica v. Nicar.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (Sept. 29, 2005) (regarding Costa 
Rica’s rights on the San Juan River), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/ 
8268.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. 
Ukr.) (Application Instituting Proceedings) (Sept. 16, 2004) (seeking to establish a mari-
time boundary that would delimit the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/1697.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008); 
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Ma-
lay./Sing.) (Special Agreement) (July 24, 2003), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/130/1785.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008). 
 287. See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.) para. 7 (Dec. 13, 2007), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/14305.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008). 
 288. See H.E. Judge Rosalyn Higgins, President, ICJ, Speech at the 58th Session of the 
International Law Commission (July 25, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
court/index.php?pr=1272&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1. 
 289. Id. 
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The interesting challenge was to have this doctrine play its important 
role, without ignoring, temporally speaking, all that had occurred in 
real life subsequently. The Court confirmed that it would look at maps 
and other data subsequent to the critical date, but to see if they evi-
denced an agreement to alter the uti possidetis line.290
The ICJ was asked to determine the boundary between Benin and Niger 
in the River Niger and River Mekou sector, which would establish de 
jure sovereignty over the disputed islands in the Niger River.
 
291 The ICJ 
applied the doctrine of uti possidetis juris to determine the inherited 
boundary from French colonial rule on the agreed critical dates: Benin’s 
independence (formerly the French colony of Dahomey) on August 1, 
1960, and Niger’s independence (formerly the French colony of Niger) 
on August 3, 1960.292 While the ICJ was mindful that applying droit 
d’outre-mer, or French colonial law, was overwhelmingly important, it 
also recognized that modern day physical realities could not be dis-
counted, especially in determining the sovereignty of islands that may 
appear or disappear over time.293 In determining the nature of droit 
d’outre-mer, the most relevant document was the decree of the President 
of the French Republic of June 16, 1895,294 which placed the entire terri-
tory of Afrique Occidentale Française under the stewardship of a Gover-
nor-General, and then divided the territory into colonies headed by Lieu-
tenant-Governors, which were divided into cercles, or smaller adminis-
trative units.295 The judgment also discussed the process for modifying 
the units’ territorial dimensions, with local Lieutenant-Governors holding 
considerable power for this modification.296 The judgment was also 
unique in that it determined the frontier on two bridges between Gaya in 
Niger and Malanville in Benin—unprecedented in the history of the terri-
torial disputes.297
                                                                                                         
 290. Id. 
 
 291. Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), 2005 I.C.J. 90, 94–103 (July 12). 
 292. Id. at 108. 
 293. See id. at 108–09. 
 294. See id. at 110. 
 295. See generally DOV RONEN, DAHOMEY: BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY 
(1975) (concerning the declaration of the independence of Dahomey, which subsequently 
became Benin); WILLIAM F.S. MILES, HAUSALAND DIVIDED: COLONIALISM AND 
INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA AND NIGER (1994) (concerning the independence of Niger and 
the division between Nigeria and Niger based on colonial linguistics). 
 296. See id. at 108–11. 
 297. See id. at 141–42. See generally Fabio Spadi, The International Court of Justice 
Judgment in the Benin-Niger Border Dispute: The Interplay of Titles and “Effectivités” 
Under the Uti Possidetis Juris Principle, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 777 (2005). 
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V. MODERN LAWS OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN LIGHT OF THE 
DOCTRINES GOVERNING TERRITORIALITY 
Having analyzed the major doctrinal tools that are available in public 
international law, and having studied their application in terms of the 
major international legal challenges that have arisen before the ICJ, it is 
now time to turn to the doctrines’ value in self-determination claims. 
This Part pays particular attention to the doctrines’ continued salience for 
territories that have been wrested from indigenous and other communi-
ties, especially those that remain effectively dispossessed and margina-
lized despite the decolonization process that may have occurred within 
the territories themselves. 
Self-determination involves the following direct constraints vis-à-vis 
its application to the land rights of indigenous peoples: (1) its expression 
in human rights law, especially in the context of raising territorial claims; 
(2) its expression in public international law; (3) the legal entitlements of 
peoples, indigenous peoples, and minorities to this right; and (4) the dif-
ficulties with the means for expressing self-determination. Many argu-
ments pertaining to indigenous peoples’ self-determination start from the 
premise that the right should be applied in the same manner that it was 
applied during decolonization,298 requiring the group asserting the right 
to self-determination to show that it had been subject to a process of co-
lonization or quasi-colonization.299 Indigenous peoples would have a 
strong claim, especially where public international law and subsequent 
colonial law were used to erase,300 ignore,301 or in some instances illegi-
timately transfer302 title to the territory that they inhabited.303
Although self-determination is promised rather gloriously to all 
peoples in the human rights covenants,
 
304
                                                                                                         
 298. See generally Kingsbury, supra note 13, at 216–34. 
 “peoples” is inevitably read in 
 299. See generally SUREDA, supra note 123, at 95–101 (discussing the analysis for 
determining entitlements to self-determination). See also Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The De-
grees of Self-Determination in the UN Era, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 304 (1994). 
 300. See ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS 
STANDARDS 131–76 (2007). 
 301. See JÉRÉMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS (2006). 
 302. See, e.g., Albert Barume, Indigenous Battling for Land Rights: The Case of the 
Ogiek of Kenya, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 365 (Joshua Castelli-
no & Niamh Walsh eds., 2005). 
 303. See Bradford, supra note 44. 
 304. See ICESCR, supra note 62, art. 1 (“All peoples have the right of self-
determination.”); ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 1 (sharing a common article 1). It would be 
difficult to construct an objective standard to measure “colonial” treatment in the modern 
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the traditional European twentieth century colonial context, and is sel-
dom extended further back in history, thus denying the right to groups 
that claim to be victims of subjugation in the ancient past in a manner 
they deem colonial. In human rights law, despite the strong rhetoric of 
self-determination, the right has limited utility in determining the fate of 
the territory historically inhabited by people of a nation or ethnie.305 This 
narrow definition nullifies the value of decolonization rhetoric for indi-
genous peoples, because the right to self-determination contained in hu-
man rights annals offers little remedy to the dispossession of land.306
During the wave of decolonization in the latter part of the twentieth 
century, the three options that existed for a unit emerging from decoloni-
zation were relatively straightforward: (1) creation of an independent 
state; (2) free association with an existing state; or (3) integration with a 
pre-existing state.
 
307 Despite the clear articulation of these options, very 
few processes of decolonization occurred through any reference to the 
people.308 Rather, the territorial units were handed over to those claiming 
sovereignty without consulting the inhabiting people.309
Despite these difficulties, the existence of the right continues to raise 
aspirations worldwide, in many instances playing into the hands of iden-
 As a result, de-
colonization was more akin to Latin American seizure of political power, 
rather than a concerted focus on the democratic consent notion that un-
derpinned the American and French Revolutions. 
                                                                                                         
context. However, denying indigenous populations of their human rights and access to 
justice provides one possible basis for such a threshold. 
 305. See Joshua Castellino, Conceptual Difficulties and the Right to Indigenous Self-
Determination, in MINORITIES, PEOPLES AND SELF-DETERMINATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF PATRICK THORNBERRY 55 (Nazila Ghanea & Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2005). 
 306. See SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 99–107 
(2000) (reflecting on the issues addressed by the HRC in article 1 of the ICCPR). See 
generally THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 
116–376 (discussing human rights instruments). See G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 307. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 59. 
 308. See generally SUREDA, supra note 123 (detailing the extent to which the decoloni-
zation processes occurred and the extent to which there was consultation). While the 
work is now dated it nonetheless remains a comprehensive account of U.N. decoloniza-
tion, much of which had already occurred at the time of writing. See id. 
 309. See JOHN D. HARGREAVES, DECOLONIZATION IN AFRICA (2d ed. 1996). The con-
sent of the Africans was needed for tranquility, though in terms of the handover of power, 
mere acquiescence would possibly suffice. See id. at 22. African consent was required by 
the British in terms of its colonies—not regarding the legitimacy of the new arrangements 
for the emerging state, but in the context of having to sell the plan at home to political 
forces opposing the U.K. Parliament. See id. at 115, 180. 
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tity entrepreneurs that seek political power at the cost of dismembering 
existing states.310 For more genuine claims, however, the right remains of 
dubious value—impossible to ignore, but a constant red herring in the 
quest for equal rights for displaced and dispossessed populations strug-
gling to come to terms with what modernity implies for traditional ways 
of life.311 As was revealed in the achievement of autonomy in the north-
ern Canadian territories of Nunavut, other means may provide a more 
useful avenue compared to self-determination claims, assuming, howev-
er, that a state is willing to engage in discussion with an indigenous 
people312—something that very few states are currently willing to do.313
Self-determination, including the potential option of political status de-
termination, i.e., the option of raising the issue of the best political struc-
ture for determination by the specific group, should be made available to 
indigenous peoples (just as it was to colonial peoples) by conceptualizing 
self-determination for indigenous peoples through an expansive analysis 
of the Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) jurisprudence on the applica-
bility of article 1(2) of the ICCPR.
 
314
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. 
 Article 1 states: 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mu-
                                                                                                         
 310. See, e.g., PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2001). It could be argued that the entire dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia was 
motivated by the entrepreneurial efforts of Slobodan Milosevic. See id. at 168. In trying 
to garner greater power within the state for Serbia, Milosevic effectively appealed to the 
more separatists elements within the state, leading in a most devastating and costly man-
ner to Yugoslavia’s dismemberment. See id. 
 311. See also International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention Concerning Indi-
genous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries arts. 13–17, June 27, 1989, 28 
I.L.M. 1384; THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 
366 (explaining that many indigenous groups are disappointed that the ILO Convention’s 
evasive language fails to address self-determination). See also Lee Swepston, Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law and Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 53 (Joshua Castellino & Niamh Walsh eds., 2005). 
 312. See JENS DAHL, JACK HICKS & PEER JULL, NUNAVUT: INUIT REGAIN CONTROL OF 
THEIR LANDS AND THEIR LIVES 24 (2000) (discussing the Inuit negotiations with the Ca-
nadian government).  
 313. The discussion in Canada over indigenous rights is in sharp contrast to the discus-
sion that has taken place in Australia under the premiership of John Howard. See 
ANDREW MARKUS, RACE: JOHN HOWARD AND THE REMAKING OF AUSTRALIA (2001). 
 314. See ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 1(2). 
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tual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived 
of its own means of subsistence. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust 
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the pro-
visions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
While the HRC—the monitoring body of the ICCPR and the quasi-
judicial monitors of Covenant obligations—has been reluctant to engage 
the issue of self-determination,315 its reluctance has changed slightly in 
the context of indigenous peoples’ claims.316 In the past, the HRC 
avoided engaging article 1.317 However, the current approach is not as 
overtly cautious and self-determination arguments are addressed under 
the rubric of indigenous rights to “subsistence.”318
                                                                                                         
 315. See, e.g., Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, Commc’n No. 78/1980, U.N. Doc. 
A39/40 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 1984); Ominayak & the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 
Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 
1990). 
 Yet, in ruling that 
self-determination can be claimed under article 1(2) rather than article 
1(1), the HRC may be accused of nevertheless taking a highly conserva-
 316. See Äärelä & Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, Commc’n No. 779/1997, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 2001); Länsman v. Finland, Commc’n 
No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 1994); 
Länsman v. Finland, Commc’n No. 671/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (U.N. 
Hum. Rts. Comm. 1996). See also S. James Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective 
Human Right Under Contemporary International Law, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 3 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin 
eds., 2000); Martin Scheinin, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 179 
(Joshua Castellino & Niamh Walsh eds., 2005) (addressing the manner in which the HRC 
has discussed and determined complaints raised by indigenous peoples). 
 317. See, e.g., Mikmaq Tribal Society v. Canada, Commc’n No. 78/1980, at 200, 202, 
U.N. Doc CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 1984). 
 318. Länsman v. Finland, Commc’n No. 671/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 
(U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 1996). Of the initial HRC cases that alleged violations of article 
1 of the ICCPR, the HRC only found a violation of the ICCPR in Lubicon Lake Band v. 
Canada, Commc’n No. 167/1984, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/45/40) (U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm. 1990). However, the HRC found that article 27 had been violated. See id. para. 
33. Since 2000, in cases similarly alleging article 1 violations, the HRC has similarly 
found violations of alternative articles of the ICCPR. See Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, 
Commc’n No. 1145/2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 
2005); Diergaardt v. Namibia, Commc’n No. 760/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ 
69/D/760/1997 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. 2000). See generally A.F. Bayefsky, Jurispru-
dence—CCPR, http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/jurisprudence/treaty/ccpr/opt/0/ 
node/5/type/all (last visited Feb. 5, 2008) (listing HRC cases alleging ICCPR violations). 
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tive and non-confrontational stance to the detriment of the drafters’ in-
tent.319
It has always been clear that the right to self-determination was consi-
dered a right of “whole peoples.” However, if the HRC finds that indi-
genous peoples face quasi-colonial situations where the right to self-
determination has been violated, restriction to only the socio-economic 
aspects of the right would seem to challenge the foundations of article 
1(1). Instead, it could be argued that the difficulty with the application of 
article 1 as a whole lies in determining who the “people” are, not the re-
strictive application of their rights once this determination has been 
made. Without a doubt, a quasi-judicial body such as the HRC is always 
likely to approach the determination of a group’s political status with 
some trepidation,
 
320
Furthermore, the HRC must not seek to undo one wrong by imposing 
another wrong. Therefore, populations resettled on indigenous territo-
ry—many of whom may have lived there for centuries—also have rights 
and cannot be dispossessed. This leads to a distinction between two types 
of claims: (1) territory where indigenous peoples, subjugated nations, or 
ethnie live on contiguous territories where they form the majority; and 
(2) territory where these communities live dispersed throughout the 
state.
 yet it could be argued that this remains crucial if the 
territorial element of self-determination is to remain alive. Article 1 as a 
whole was put in its preeminent position at the head of the ICESCR and 
the ICCPR on the grounds that, unless a subjugated people can determine 
its own political, economic, social, and cultural future, an articulation of 
the rest of their human rights may prove meaningless. 
321
                                                                                                         
 319. See Joshua Castellino & Jérémie Gilbert, Self-Determination, Indigenous Peoples 
and Minorities, 3 MACQUARIE L. J. 155 (2003). 
 In the latter, a territorially entrenched self-determination solution 
would be impractical due to the need to respect other groups living 
among the indigenous people. However, where indigenous peoples or 
others with genuine territorial self-determination claims live in homo-
genous pockets, a more coherent engagement of this claim would be con-
sistent with the evolving nature of indigenous claims themselves and a 
growing sense of the rights of historically suppressed communities. This 
would also offer an adequate response to the HRC’s own past conserva-
tive approach as indicated by General Comment 12, which interprets 
 320. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF 
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 22–24 (2002). 
 321. See Castellino & Gilbert, supra note 319. 
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self-determination without the territorial ownership element, and thus, 
for many, is not true self-determination at all.322
From this distinction between contiguous, homogenous groups living 
in discrete territorial units and non-contiguous, non-homogenous groups 
that are territorially dispersed, four remedies of political self-
determination emerge: 
 
1. Political self-determination that includes a consent-based de-
termination of the fate of the territory.323
2. Non-political self-determination that includes a range of rights 
that fall short of accepting the territorial claim.
 This remedy may or 
may not extend to possessory interdicts over contested territories 
and could be offered to territorially based indigenous people liv-
ing in contiguous zones or homogenous pockets. It also includes 
the right of such determination and addresses the subsequent title 
to the territory they inhabit. 
324
3. Non-political self-determination to minorities that guarantees 
human rights and access to special measures, but does not confer 
the right of self-determination in any sense, on the grounds that 
minorities are not peoples.
 This remedy 
could be offered to non-territorially based indigenous peoples to 
guarantee access to human rights law and to address issues of 
personal autonomy. 
325
4. Remedial right to self-determination where widespread and 
consistent rights denial occurs—usually in the form of crimes 
 
                                                                                                         
 322. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights [HCHR], General 
Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Article 1), Human Rights 
Committee, 21st Sess. (1984), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and Gen-
eral Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.5, at 121 (2001). See also U.N. CERD, General Recommendation XXIII 
on Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/Misc.13/Rev.4 (Aug. 18, 1997); U.N. 
CERD, General Recommendation XXI on Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/48/Misc.7/Rev.3 (1996); U.N. HCHR, General Comment 23: The Rights of Mi-
norities (Article 27), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994). 
 323. Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Point Plan, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW 
WILSON (Ray Stannard Baker & William E. Dodd eds., 1927). See also Anthony Whelan, 
Wilsonian Self-Determination and the Versailles Settlement, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99, 
99 (1994). 
 324. See Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, su-
pra note 219 (advocating for a more forthright right to autonomy, even if it is not neces-
sarily as widely applied). 
 325. This option maintains the current status quo, where minorities—vis-à-vis General 
Comment 12 and other documents—are not clearly entitled to the right to self-
determination, which is reserved for “peoples.” See supra note 322. 
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against humanity or genocide—against a vulnerable group, such 
as indigenous peoples or minorities. The exercise of the territori-
al rights associated with self-determination should be part of the 
international community’s duty to protect against gross human 
rights violations.326
One vital consideration is a group’s territorial basis since it would be 
nearly impossible to realign states where indigenous populations do not 
live in a contiguous zone. Rather than subjecting all group claims to this 
standard of territorial basis and denying the territorial element of many 
genuine self-determination claims, the nuanced approach above will help 
give meaning to the right to self-determination in the post-colonial con-
text. Territorially based indigenous peoples would have rights akin to 
those of colonial peoples, including political self-determination that in-
cludes a consent-based determination of territory.
 
327 Indigenous peoples 
not inhabiting distinct territories would have the right to non-political 
self-determination, which falls short of granting territorial claims.328
Also, as currently posited in terms of the ICCPR, minorities would 
continue to have their rights guaranteed under article 27 of the ICCPR
 
329 
and would only be able to raise admissible claims under article 1, where 
allegations of gross human rights violations call into play the internation-
al community’s duty to protect.330
                                                                                                         
 326. See Anaya, Self-Determination as a Collective Human Right Under Contempo-
rary International Law, supra note 13, at 12–14. But see Patrick Thornberry, Self-
Determination and Indigenous Peoples: Objections and Responses, in 
OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 39 
(Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
 Apart from this eventuality, minority 
 327. See Joshua Castellino, The “Right” to Land, International Law & Indigenous 
Peoples, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 89, 111 (Joshua Castellino & 
Niamh Walsh eds., 2005). 
 328. See id. at 111. 
 329. See ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 27 (“In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to 
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.”) See also U.N. 
HCHR, General Comment 23: The Rights of Minorities (Article 27), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994). 
 330. See A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) 
(describing the duty to protect as an “emerging norm that there is a collective responsibil-
ity to protect”). This high-level panel was convened by Secretary General Kofi Annan to 
“assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how our existing 
policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make recommenda-
tions for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security for all 
in the twenty-first century.” Id.¶ 3. The report was also subsequently endorsed by Secre-
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rights protection should focus on guaranteeing non-discrimination and 
equality, with the possibility of constructing affirmative action measures 
where such action is warranted and likely to be effective.331 In addition, 
“internal self-determination,” i.e., self-determination that does not take 
into account the title to territory aspect, could also be entertained in the 
name of effective participation within the political rubric of the state.332
This four-tiered approach to self-determination claims highlights the 
interaction between the doctrines governing territoriality in international 
law and the right to self-determination of subjugated peoples. Further-
more, it offers some remedy to past processes that were inadequately 
addressed in international law, the persistence of which undermines its 
claim to provide justice. While this approach gives indigenous claims a 
higher valence than that of other submerged nations, this is a justifiable 
distinction that already exists
 
333 on the grounds that indigenous peoples 
are nonetheless “peoples,” while minorities may not be. The approach 
also has the advantage of rectifying the incomprehensible double stan-
dard where more recent colonization is subjected to the territorial remedy 
of self-determination while older colonization is not. In any case, the in-
clusion of indigenous peoples as peoples in international law has found 
some traction, as reflected in the creation of the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Populations and the controversial Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.334
                                                                                                         
tary-General Annan in a 2005 report. See The Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005 (Mar. 21, 2005). 
 
 331. See generally GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM & JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1991) (providing a discussion of affirmative action and its inter-
esting legal challenges); MICHAEL BANTON, INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 87–88 (1996) (addressing the value of affirmative action for internation-
al human rights law); THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (Steven M. Cahn ed., 2d ed. 
2002) (providing a more current offering on the affirmative action debate, especially as 
played out in the United States). 
 332. See Gilbert, Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, su-
pra note 219, at 307 (“[S]elf-determination is increasingly recognized as having an inter-
nal aspect that requires full and effective participation by all groups in society.”). 
 333. See generally TIMO MAKKONEN, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND OTHERNESS: THE 
CONCEPTS OF “PEOPLE,” “INDIGENOUS PEOPLE” AND “MINORITY” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2000). 
 334. See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples was adopted by a vote of 143 (in favor) to 4 (against) with 11 abstentions. See 
Press Release, U.N., General Assembly Adopts Declaration On Rights Of Indigenous 
Peoples; “Major Step Forward” Towards Human Rights For All, Says President (Sept. 
13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. See 
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Such developments are congruous with the emergence of norms 
against genocide, crimes against humanity, and the international commu-
nity’s duty to protect populations against gross human rights violations. 
Validating remedial self-determination, a mechanism arguably at work in 
Bangladesh, Eritrea, Timor-Leste, and Kosovo, would effectively pro-
vide sanctions in law, rendering states accountable to the international 
community for mistreatment of indigenous groups.335 In one sense, the 
recognition of remedial self-determination reflects Grotius’ maxim jus 
resistendi ac secessionis.336 It is the natural law right of self-defense, 337
                                                                                                         
also PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 370–96 (2002) 
(providing insight into the contentious nature of the framing of the document and its his-
tory). 
 
 335. See supra notes 9, 222. See generally G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 57. The 
resolution articulates the rationale of self-determination as the need to promote friendly 
relations among states and to end colonization: 
Every State has a duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization 
of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . . 
. . . 
Every state has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action universal 
respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . . 
. . . 
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives 
peoples . . . in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and re-
sistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-
determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support . . . . 
. . . 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or en-
couraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States con-
ducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a govern-
ment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinc-
tion as to race, creed or colour. 
Every state shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption 
of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country. 
Id. For more on this document and its importance in developing the norm of self-
determination, see CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL “NATIONAL” IDENTITY, supra note 15, at 34–41. 
 336. See NEUBERGER, supra note 25, at 4; HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 267 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1992). 
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and in exercise of this right, the entity may opt to secede from an existing 
state with the backing of the international community.338
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the uncertain legal valence ascribed to self-determination, es-
pecially in its territorial dimension, it remains the only vehicle through 
which indigenous rights to territory can be expressed. The right itself has 
seen numerous changes since its early expressions, and at each fin de 
siècle it has developed nuances as a political principle. Giving a principle 
of uncertain substantive content the authority of a legal tenet was argua-
bly fraught with danger. Yet, political forces bestowed the right to self-
determination as the vehicle for expression of freedom in the face of op-
pression. However, in looking towards self-determination as a tool for 
modern freedom from oppression, Kingsbury’s warning vis-à-vis the fu-
ture of self-determination is worth heeding: 
[The] argument from decolonisation has been reinforced by practice 
suggesting that self-determination in the strong form as a right to estab-
lish a separate state may be an extraordinary remedy in distinct territo-
ries suffering massive human rights violations orchestrated by govern-
ing authorities based elsewhere in the state . . . . But the far-reaching 
argument that self-determination in this strong form of statehood or al-
most complete autonomy is essential as a general precondition for hu-
man rights does not establish which groups or territories are the units of 
self-determination for purposes of human rights enhancement; nor does 
it overcome legitimate concerns about the threats to human rights and 
to human security posed by repeated fragmentation and irredentism. 
The remedial human rights justification for self-determination, while 
persuasive in some cases, is most unlikely to become normal rather 
than exceptional unless the sovereignty and legitimacy of states de-
clines precipitously.339
A more concerted approach at engaging the underlying tensions in 
many post-colonial states, like the one proposed, will allow more tho-
rough analysis and reflection on whether the quest to protect order—by 
sanctifying inherited international frontiers—has truly yielded order. In 
some parts of the world, the accepted boundaries have become the ac-
 
                                                                                                         
 337. See Castellino, The Secession of Bangladesh: Setting New Standards in Interna-
tional Law?, supra note 222, at 93–94. 
 338. See supra note 222 (discussing territorial claims achieved through international 
political processes rather than law). 
 339. Benedict Kingsbury, Reconstructing Self-Determination: A Relational Approach, 
in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 23 
(Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
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cepted markers of identity, but in many other places, boundaries continue 
to fuel aspiration and separatism. The law as it stands suggests that uti 
possidetis juris lines may be modified by consent. However, this consent 
is restricted to that between sovereign states. This particularly disadvan-
tages cross-border communities who are often unrepresented by the gov-
ernments on both sides of the frontier. It also fails to provide any remedy 
to indigenous peoples, many of whom are not in strong enough political 
positions to mobilize support for their causes. As it stands, non-state ac-
tors have no explicit right in international law to demand or even raise 
questions of territorial adjustment, rendering the territorial aspects of 
self-determination relatively meaningless. It is mainly this interpretation 
that has led the quasi-judicial human rights bodies, such as the HRC and 
its counterpart in the International Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, to articulate the norm of internal self-
determination.340 However, denying the political territorial aspect of self-
determination reduces this historic right—used as a rallying point to fight 
injustice—to a relatively mundane discussion about political rights with-
in states. The claimants rightly fail to see why they need to exist within 
externally defined units for the sake of historical convenience and inter-
national order. As a result, aggrieved and unrepresented peoples along 
with political opportunists raise the banner of self-determination, often 
resorting to the use of force to internationalize their conflict and seek 
resolution of the issue away from the realm of law and within the realm 
of power.341
Thus, in terms of indigenous peoples and the right to land, international 
law is keen to guarantee order and stymie any norm that could potentially 
violate that order. Accordingly, international law stresses that self-
determination should involve the accommodation of differing national 
identities within the confines of the state, rather than the creation of new 
states or the dismembering of older states, and quasi-judicial human 
rights bodies are less than keen to make the connection between self-
determination and the right to property for indigenous peoples in defe-
rence to state parties. 
 
                                                                                                         
 340. See generally Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-
Determination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-
DETERMINATION 101 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993). 
 341. See generally U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Prot. of Minorities, Minority Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2000/CRP.3 (May 10, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
huridoc-
da/huridoca.nsf/AllSymbols/31CE7BBED216F60C802568FD0047B63A/$File/G001378
6.pdf; CHRISTOPHER O. QUAYE, LIBERATION STRUGGLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). 
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While it is commendable that indigenous peoples’ enfranchisement has 
grown within the U.N. and most state systems, it remains akin in many 
cases to the granting of full franchise to members living within a colonial 
setting. For a fully acceptable solution to the situation, the underlying 
basis of the self-determination claim needs to be addressed. However, the 
constraints to such an address remain clear—populations that have set-
tled upon the territory have claims too. The state often acts in the interest 
of these settler claims, and the state consents to human rights law in the 
name of its inhabitants. This particular debate has resulted in the frustra-
tion of several important legal documents within the U.N. system, 342 
within regional settings,343 and also in the context of other organiza-
tions.344 The stalling point remains the issue of land rights, and while 
important case law is being developed on the subject,345 this jurispru-
dence tends to occur within domestic rather than international settings. 346
                                                                                                         
 342. See U.N. ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Mi-
norities, Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples  
103–15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.SUB.2.RES.1994.45.En. 
See also Siegfried Wiessner & Marie Battiste, The 2000 Revision of the United Nations 
Draft Principles and Guidelines on the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, 
13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 383 (2000); THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 370–96 (discussing the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples). 
 
Thus, we remain a considerable way from being able to address the issue 
of land rights within international and human rights law. Rather than a 
clash of ideology, as it was in the negotiation of the International Bill of 
 343. See Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., 1333d sess., OEA/Ser/L/V/.II.95 (1997). See also THORNBERRY, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 397–404 (discussing the 
Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). 
 344. See Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or Universe onto Itself? Indigenous 
Peoples’ Human Rights and the World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigen-
ous Peoples, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527 (2002) (commenting on developing standards 
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 this is a clash between the competing interests of the Old 
World—in establishing indigenous communities that have been dispos-
sessed over time—and the New—in legitimately occupying the same 
territory. The establishment of an appropriate mechanism for addressing 
this clash remains central to the protection, promotion, and propagation 
of indigenous rights and identity. 
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